## 1AC – Expansion

### Cartels Adv

#### The Seventh Circuit’s *Motorola* decision used an unclear and amorphous interpretation of comity to limit the scope of the Sherman Act extraterritorially – it created uncertainty that SCOTUS chose not to act on

Rogers ‘16 [Paul; 2016; Professor of Law and Former Dean, SMU Dedman School of Law; Of Counsel, Locke Lord, Dallas, Texas; Competition Law Chronicle; “A Current Look at Foreign Cartels and the United States Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,” vol. 2, https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1791&context=law\_faculty]

The United States‘ Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), enacted in 1982, is designed to set the framework for determining if and when U.S. antitrust laws have jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct involving commerce foreign to the United States.1 While excluding U.S. import commerce from its reach, it seeks to both clarify and limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, perhaps in partial deference to foreign concerns about the reach of those laws to competitive conduct abroad. It is far, however, from an example of clarity in drafting.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described it as a ―web of words‖3 while the Third Circuit noted that it was ―inelegantly phrased.‖4

The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the applicability of the FTAIA only in its 2004 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. decision.5 The case involved a world-wide vitamin price fixing scheme which, it was alleged, caused higher vitamin prices in the U.S. as well as other countries such as Ecuador. The Court ruled that U.S. purchasers could bring a Sherman Act claim under the FTAIA but that buyers in other countries could not since their harm was foreign to the United States. In interpreting the statute, the Court held that the act sets forth a general rule placing all non-import activity involving foreign commerce outside of the reach of the Sherman Act. But, the Court noted, the act ―brings such conduct back within the Sherman Act‘s reach if the restraint at issue has a ―direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable‖ anticompetitive impact on U.S. commerce.6

Litigation involving the FTAIA has spiked in the last decade or so as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has increasingly prosecuted foreign-based cartels, spurring many coattail civil lawsuits in addition. In a number of investigations, the DOJ has targeted foreign suppliers of component parts that were incorporated by other companies into finished products assembled overseas but later imported for sale to U.S. customers. Leading examples include TFT-LCD panels for finished products such as televisions, notebook computers, and cell phones and various parts assemblies used to make automobiles.

Often at issue is whether the foreign component cartel had the required ―direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect‖ on US commerce.7 The DOJ‘s position in those cases is typically that U.S. consumers were harmed because inflated cartel prices for the components paid for abroad were incorporated into higher prices for the finished products that were sold in the United States.8 It is concerned, however, that interpretations of the FTAIA that preclude the Sherman Act from reaching foreign component part cartels unduly limit its ability to protect U.S. consumers from competitive harm.9

Although lower courts have been mindful of the Supreme Court‘s admonition that Congress intended that the FTAIA ―clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act‘s scope as applied to foreign commerce,‖10 they have applied the statute inconsistently. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that ―direct‖ under the statute means ―as an immediate consequence‖ with no ―intervening developments.‖11 In contrast, the Second and Seventh Circuits have rejected the Ninth Circuit‘s test, instead defining direct as having a ―reasonable proximate cause nexus.‖12

The nexus test has proven difficult to apply and one group of commentators has argued that in practice it often devolves ―into subjective metaphysical analysis.‖13 But with respect to component part cartels, there is always the argument that effects on U.S. Commerce are not direct where a price fixed component is incorporated overseas into a finished product that is eventually imported into the United States. Thus, under either test, a U.S. plaintiff suing a foreign component part cartel cannot be assured that it can meet FTAIA requirements.

The FTAIA‘s seemingly intractability is perhaps best illustrated by the recent Motorola litigation before the Seventh Circuit. It involved claims based on foreign sales of price-fixed LCD panels incorporated into cellphones that were then imported into the United States. In earlier litigation the DOJ had alleged that the overcharges on those panels entering the U.S. exceeded $500 million.14

In Motorola I the court first held that the targeted conduct did not have a direct effect on U.S. commerce, but subsequently vacated the opinion.15 Then in Motorola II the same panel reversed itself on the direct effect test, holding that if prices of the components were fixed, the effect on U.S. commerce would meet the test for purposes of the FTAIA.16 But it focused additionally on the second domestic effects question under the statute – whether, assuming a direct effect on U.S. commerce, those effects give rise ―to an antitrust cause of action under the Sherman Act.‖17 In doing so, it held that the FTAIA precluded plaintiff ‘s claims because the domestic effect of a conspiracy to fix component part prices did not ―give rise‖ to a Sherman Act claim. The court reasoned that although the domestic effect of the conspiracy was increased cell phone prices in the U.S., that is not what harmed the plaintiff, which was a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of the American parent company.18 It had purchased the price fixed components directly from the conspirators abroad. According to the court, its harm was suffered abroad when it purchased the price-fixed panels abroad, but that harm was not dependent on the domestic effect of increased cell phone prices.19

In support of its holding, the Motorola II court referenced the Supreme Court‘s concern expressed in Empagran about the risk of excessive extraterritorial application of U.S. law interfering ―with a foreign nation‘s ability independently to regulate its own affairs.‖20 Of course, that concern for international comity is a prime motivation for the FTAIA itself.21 The proof is in the pudding, however. That is, it is the American courts which are left with the task of interpreting and applying an admittedly poorly drafted and confusing statute. As such, it seems that they are the ultimate purveyors of comity.

Part of the judicial function of course is to provide guidance and predictability. But with the circuit split after Motorola II, there is currently little of either for cases involving component part price-fixing abroad. Motorola II certainly restricts the reach of U.S. antitrust laws to those conspiracies and adds additional hurdles for the DOJ and private plaintiffs seeking relief for domestic harms. In addition to the direct and substantial effects requirement, plaintiffs must be prepared to meet a narrow, restrictive ―domestic effects‖ test to satisfy the FTAIA.22

But before one asserts that Motorola II has effectively swept away all U.S. antitrust claims against foreign component part price-fixers, it is important to remember the Supreme Court‘s admonition in Empagran that it matters who the plaintiff is.23 For example, if Motorola had made its purchase decisions and executed purchase orders in the U.S. rather than abroad through a foreign subsidiary, the result might have been different.24 Further, the DOJ, while is concerned about the effect of cases like Motorola II on its ability to criminally prosecute foreign based component part cartels, has typically asserted jurisdiction through the FTAIA‘s import commerce exception.25

Nonetheless Motorola II has limited the reach of Sherman Act claims to foreign component part cartels. But that case may have created a circuit split and it is far from clear how other circuits might handle the same type of claim. On June 15, 2015, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Motorola II and the Ninth Circuit‘s Hsiung case, so we are not going to get a definitive answer anytime soon.

Motorola II may have shifted the focus to the domestic effects analysis and away from the direct effects requirement, which could perhaps soften the supposed circuit spit since the FTAIA requires both. As a result, it may be that in declining to hear the case, the Supreme Court did not see a circuit split.26

In any event, judicial application of the FTAIA seems to have produced more questions than answers. While ideally the law should create certainty, the combination of an unartfully drafted statute, differing judicial interpretations of that statute, and the somewhat amorphous concept of comity all combine to produce a great deal of uncertainty about the application of the FTAIA to foreign component part cartels.

#### International cartels wreck US economic growth – the aff ensures growth and innovation across industries

Leonardo ‘16 [Lizl Leonardo; 2016; J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2018; B.S., 2011, De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines; DePaul Law Review; “A Proposal to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce.” vol. 66, https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4008&context=law-review]

Anticompetitive activity of cartels and the globalization of commerce have exponentially accelerated the gap between buyers and sellers.374 Collectively, increasing poverty, the decline in median income, and the collusion of companies to sell products at a certain price put buyers at the mercy of these cartels.375 Sometimes, because the products are inelastic, consumers have no choice but to accept the inflated purchase price.376 As global supply chains continue to expand, business transactions become a source of potential victims by perpetrators of consumer fraud.377 This raises the need for stricter rules to protect the consumers who are more likely in a worse financial position than that of companies taking advantage of these consumers. Expanding the reach of the FTAIA to include transactions made outside of the United States but nonetheless have an impact to U.S. commerce, as held by the Ninth Circuit, will reduce this prevalent issue.378 This Part discusses the effects of this proposal to the protection of U.S. consumers and the international business community.

In today’s global economy, it is difficult to distinguish and separate foreign from domestic effects.379 Global supply chains have made it easier for products to move rapidly and with ease. The United States, holding twenty-one percent of the worldwide Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is most susceptible to cartel targeting.380 With twenty-nine percent market share, it is the largest consumer in the world.381 Any impact of collusion in the international market is intertwined with a harm to customers in the United States.382 Measures must be taken to ensure that markets remain open and competitive; no company should able to dominate and restrict the supply of products sold. With a rigid rule in place, formation of domestic and international cartels would decline, further strengthening competition.383 After all, the protection of consumers through the preservation of deterrence is one of the main focuses of antitrust laws.384

Courts, as well as scholars, have commented that cartel deterrence should be the primary concern over international comity issues in analyzing the FTAIA.385 In United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 386 the First Circuit concluded that principles of comity should not “shield” a defendant from any intentional wrongdoings, especially if a substantial effect occurred in U.S. markets.387 Otherwise, because cartel members are more likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct, a decision that is based more heavily on the international comity principle would make company transactions, domestic and abroad, confusing and ultimately increase the burden on consumers.388

Cartels, more often than not, operate in secrecy. Members can coordinate and collude to fix prices outside of U.S. jurisdiction, making it much more difficult for the U.S. government to detect and prosecute them.389 To achieve deterrence, a rule that will dissuade companies from engaging in anticompetitive conduct from the very beginning will allow antitrust enforcement to be more manageable.390 A cartel will most likely weigh the potential damages engaging in anticompetitive activities with the potential benefits of those anticompetitive activities.391 A study conducted in the United Kingdom showed that labor productivity declined when industries are characterized by collusion or when competition is low.392 The study showed, however, that once a strict antitrust law was enforced, the gap declined, if not disappeared.393

The presence of competition drives productivity by incentivizing companies to be more efficient.394 Studies have revealed that competition boosts product innovation and creativity, all while firms strive to reduce their costs, by encouraging them to produce higher-quality and more diverse goods and services at more competitive prices.395 Consumers will gain more access to markets they had not previously been exposed to as a result of commercial competition.396

Cartels limit the presence of competition in the economy.397 Once producers work together to protect their own interests, to the detriment of consumers, competition is eliminated.398 Cartel members either agree on a fixed price at which to sell certain products or restrict the quantity of output of the product released into the market.399 By deliberately restricting the output released into the market, without a natural shift in the consumers’ demand, the supply decreases, thereby increasing the price of the product.400 When most of the producers in an industry are part of a cartel, consumers will have no means to find a substitute, and they will have no choice but to accept the inflated price.401 For example, when AU Optronics and other defendants colluded to artificially set the price of the LCD panels, Motorola and other plaintiffs had no choice but to subsequently increase the price of their own products that used these LCD panels.402 Without the cartelpriced LCD panels, Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries would have been able to buy them at the market price and charge U.S. consumers less than they ultimately did.403

Extending the reach of the FTAIA to foreign conduct with an impact on U.S. commerce makes economic sense.404 Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in Den Norske was correct: Emphasizing the role of deterrence protects market efficiency.405 He argued that a broad interpretation of the FTAIA would aid the DOJ’s efforts in curtailing international cartels.406 A cartel’s overall profitability is favorably impacted by anticompetitive conduct, and this may lead cartel members to either further restrict the output or increase the price of the product.407 A decrease in competition could potentially move market share away from these efficient producers.408 Thus, a consistent application of the Ninth Circuit ruling across all U.S. jurisdictions will limit both this unacceptable behavior and the foreign companies’ incentive to form cartels. Foreign companies will be deterred from price-fixing knowing that they could be liable for anticompetitive conspiracies, even for transactions that occurred outside of the United States.409 Studies have already shown that antitrust enforcement increases productivity growth.410 In fact, a study has concluded that the price of products tends to drop approximately twenty to forty percent after cartels are broken up.411 The price-fixing issue is not only prevalent in the manufacturing industry, but also in the industries at issue in Hui Hsiung and Motorola. 412 Studies show that increased competition also benefits the agricultural, telecommunications, transport, and professional services industries.413 Moreover, even though competition usually starts at a domestic level, a ruling against cartel formation will positively affect the competitiveness of the domestic products as they compete in the international community.414 Companies typically acquire their production inputs from local markets and industries.415 If these industries lack competition, product prices in these markets may not be priced competitively, which affects the finished products’ competitiveness with foreign rivals.416

#### That leads to nuclear war

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

#### Integrated and global supply chains solve every hotspot for conflict – material integration prevents war and encourages resolution – untangling risks the future of global stability.

Khanna '16 [Parag; 4/19/16; Senior Research Fellow in the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore; "From War to Tug-of-War: The Global Fight for Connectivity," https://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-tug-war-the-global-fight-connectivity-15831]//GJ

Here is my prediction: Taiwan won’t cause World War III. Nor will Kashmir, nor the Senkaku Islands, nor the nonexistent Iranian nuclear bomb. We aren’t very good at predicting wars. The wars that have broken out in the recent past—the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, Russia invading Ukraine, the proxy war under way in Syria—weren’t predicted by anyone.

Furthermore, applying ancient wisdom such as the “Thucydides trap” only gets us so far. In 2015, respected Harvard professor Graham Allison published a study covering five hundred years of geopolitical power transitions and found that war broke out between the “ruling” power and its “rising” challenger in twelve out of sixteen cases. Based on these historical odds, war between the United States and China is likely but not inevitable. The most important strategy to avoid sleepwalking into World War III, Allison’s brilliant paper urged, is a “long pause for reflection.” Let’s take that pause.

\*\*\*

This isn’t 1914. In our haste to make analogies to a century ago, we have neglected the differences. European nations traded heavily across each other prior to World War I, but they did so as vertically integrated mercantile empires drawing on raw materials from their own vast colonies. They traded in finished goods without outsourcing production to each other. We did not have today’s internationally distributed manufacturing networks in 1914. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought trade interdependence; in the twenty-first century, we have complex supply chain dispersal as well—including among rival superpowers.

Even more than trade, it is investment that determines the stability of relations. Under a Cold War geopolitical paradigm, rivals wouldn’t invest in each other either; the United States and the Soviet Union certainly didn’t. But today’s robust flows of global investment among friends and enemies—“frenemies”—highlight how we have shifted from a Westphalian world to a supply-chain world. This financial and investment integration comes in the form of the trillions of dollars of assets invested in each other’s currencies and equities, as well as the tangible, productive capital—factories, real estate, banks, agriculture—they have bought and built inside other’s territory to efficiently and profitably access their markets.

If the United States and China were to go to war, the most immediate casualty would be Walmart, America’s largest retailer, 70 percent of whose merchandise is imported from China. Walmart has also been buying e-commerce companies such as Yihaodian.com to boost sales in China. The world’s most valuable company, Apple (also American), would also see its stock plummet, with so much of the market sentiment around its potential linked to growth in China. Two other American technology giants, Google and Facebook, would have to give up their cherished dreams of equal access behind China’s “Great Firewall,” and Hollywood studios, already accused of self-censorship to gain investment such as Dalian Wanda’s recent purchase of Legendary Entertainment for $3.5 billion, would find themselves banned from the world’s fastest-growing film market.

Approximately 60 percent of the Fortune 500’s revenues come from overseas sales, and the recently ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement is an American-led effort to nudge Asia’s share of America’s exports up even higher—with the potential for China itself to eventually join the trade area. As of March 2016, China imports American shale oil supplies from Texas. Direct confrontation is thus not in anyone’s interest so long as China needs peace for growth, America needs China for its hardware and everyone relies on shipping through the South China Sea.

Supply chains thus diminish the incentives for conflict. Leaders think twice, and step back from the brink. The growing depth of global cross-border trade and investment make geopolitics much more complex than in previous eras. When Presidents Obama and Xi held a 2013 summit at Sunnylands in California and spoke of aspiring toward “a new kind of great power relationship,” that was a reflection of the current reality—not a future scenario.

The common-sense truth is that while leaders talk about “red lines” for public consumption, and navies come dangerously close to trading direct fire, global market integration churns forward, knowing that there are two kinds of mutually assured destruction at play: military and economic. Military maneuvers don’t tell us enough about what drives leverage among great powers nor what they are willing to fight over. The tangled complexities of today’s system force leaders to think beyond borders and make functional calculations about the cost-benefit utility of their strategies—knowing full well that supply-chain warfare involves not just an enemy “over there” but also one’s own deep interests “over there.”

Waiting for World War III thus recalls Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, in which Vladimir and Estragon resolve to hang themselves if Godot does not arrive—so they simply sit endlessly. Their would-be savior, of course, never comes, but the protagonists never actually commit suicide either.

It is well documented that the number and frequency of interstate wars has fallen to nearly zero. Equally important, but far less discussed, is our ability to ring-fence conflicts, containing them at the local or regional level rather than allowing them to spillover too widely or escalate too sharply. The one genuine international conflict of the past several years, between Russia and Ukraine, is an example of this. Russia has not invaded the Baltics, marched into Poland, shut off gas to Europe in the winter or otherwise cleaved the European Union. Russia lacks the capacity to do so, and knows the repercussions of overreach.

The Arab world also continues to seize daily headlines. Syria is undeniably a regional proxy war, meaning that chaos there will continue. But it is not likely that Sunni powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia will directly escalate against Russia and Iran, whose forces are backing Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime. Saudi Arabia and Iran are also jockeying in Iraq, marking yet another chapter in Iraq’s destruction that began with the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, the disastrous invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. invasion in 2003 and brutal insurgency ever since. But Iraq, too, will not become the flash point that triggers war among great powers. While all of these conflicts are tragic, none of them, civil or international, are of world-historical significance.

A far more important driver of the long-term geopolitical positioning among key powers is not their role in any of these minor wars, but how they play the great supply-chain tug-of-war that is a far more pervasive reality than international warfare. Tug-of-war is an apt metaphor for our times. The world’s oldest team sport, its rituals are recorded in ancient stone etchings from Egypt to Greece to China to Guinea. Often conducted in resplendent royal ceremonies, tug-of-war was used by the soldiers of great armies to build strength in preparation for combat. In the eighth century, the Tang dynasty emperor Xuanzong was known to pit over five hundred warriors on each side of a rope over 150 meters long.

The rope in today’s geopolitical tug-of-war is connectivity. States want to control the transportation, energy and communications infrastructures and markets that enable them to acquire resources, access markets and move up the value chain. We don’t fight over the borders that divide us, but rather pull and yank the supply chains that connect us. While very few societies are at war, all societies are caught in this global tug-of-war, competing over the flows of money, goods, resources, technology, knowledge and talent transpiring between them.

Wars of connectivity are won by economic master planning rather than military doctrine. Think about it: twenty-first-century China is not a superpower because of the size of its military arsenal, but because it has become the central hub for the world’s manufacturing and electronics supply chains, built a sizeable trade surplus and enormous currency reserves, and penetrated most of its neighbors through robust infrastructure networks and become their main foreign investor and export destination. Do you have any clue how many nuclear weapons China has? Exactly: It doesn’t matter. But you probably know a fair bit by now about how China builds special economic zones, buys and steals foreign technology, and capitalizes companies with billions of dollars to ramp up quickly and capture global markets that range from solar panels to mobile handsets.

Britain’s elite Royal Military Academy Sandhurst publishes a manual of strategies for success in tug-of-war, pointing out that a good team “synchronizes its movements to the point that their pull feels like it comes from a single, unified being.” Does America act like this? Do Washington politicians, the Fed, Wall Street bankers, Texas oil companies, Silicon Valley tech companies and the other players on America’s team act like a single, unified being? Or does China do it better? Tug-of-war is won slowly and carefully. Smart teams dig in their heels to hold ground and tire out opponents while collectively taking small steps to ultimately gain control.

Tug-of-war is still war without end, a marathon without a finish line. Winston Churchill once advised that it is always better to “jaw-jaw” than to “war-war,” meaning diplomacy is preferable to conflict. Today’s world is a hybrid of the two: It is an endless tug-tug.

The future of global stability hinges on whether great powers think and act in terms of sovereignty or supply chains—if they learn the benefits of fighting tug-of-war instead of the real thing. It is no doubt unwise to argue that World War III is a passé risk. However, as the French scholar Raymond Aron argued, nuclear deterrence and the benefits of hindsight are crucial in warding against the uncontrolled escalations of the twentieth century or even harrowing episodes such as the Cuban missile crisis. Furthermore, China’s neo-mercantilism today is quite different from the zero-sum European colonial mercantilism of centuries ago: It is the pursuit of catch-up modernization rather than global hegemony. China seeks foreign raw materials and technology, not foreign territory. The smoother the supply chains, the more satisfied China will be.

A hyperconnected, multipolar world is uncharted and dangerous territory, but the paradox of tug-of-war may be that the longer it goes on, the more everyone wins. If we play our cards right, North Korea will become a supply-chain condominium of China and South Korea and other investors variously exploiting its tremendous mineral and agricultural resources while modernizing its nascent manufacturing capacity. India and Pakistan will revive the historic Grand Trunk Road of trade linkages stretching from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, and complete the natural gas pipeline from Iran via Pakistan to India. China and Taiwan will deepen their supply chain linkages and accept the outstanding differences in political systems. And China and Japan will settle their historical grievances through generational change in leadership, and accept with maturity the obvious hierarchy of Asia’s future.

Today’s world is full of tension, strife and hostility: nuclear standoffs, terrorist insurgencies, collapsing states and tragic civil conflicts. It is healthy to remind ourselves that many of our ongoing flash points could potentially escalate through unpredictable chain reactions into global conflagration. But it is even more important to pay attention to what we are doing that prevents the unintended slide into disaster—and do more of it. The future of global stability hinges on whether we continue global supply-chain integration and content ourselves with waging tug-of-war rather than the real thing. The world’s oldest team sport has an admirable track record: almost nobody has ever died playing it.

#### And globalized CRM supply chains are hyper-vulnerable to anticompetitive conduct that shocks global battery markets – the entire market is at risk

Umbach ‘18 [Frank; 2018; Research director of the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at King’s College, London; adjunct senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyan Technological University (NTU) in Singapore, senior associate at the Centre for European Security Strategies (CESS GmbH), Munich, executive advisor of Proventis Partners GmbH, Munich, and a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Natolin/Warsaw (Poland); "Energy Security in a Digitalised World and its Geostrategic Implications," https://www.kas.de/documents/265079/265128/Energy+Security+in+a+Digitalised+World+and+its+Geostrategic+Implications+Final.pdf/07691140-d019-4f4c-5363-795d9aeea361?version=1.0&t=1541645390708]

The worldwide electrification of the transport and other industry sectors, the development of a new generation of batteries for electricity storage as well as the digitalization of the industries, including the spread of robotics and artificial intelligence systems in the industry (‘industry 4.0’) will further boost the worldwide demand for CRMs such as lithium, cobalt and others. As a result, it might create new and unprecedented challenges, including bottlenecks and supply shortages, for the global supply chains of the CRMs on each stage ranging from mining to processing, refining and manufacturing.

The production of CRMs is geopolitically - compared with the concentration of conventional oil and gas resources - more challenging and problematic as currently 50% of CRMs are located in fragile states or politically unstable regions. Moreover, security of supply risks are not just constrained to primary natural resources and CRMs but also to the import of semimanufactured and refined goods as well as finished products. Manipulated prices, restricted supplies and attempts at cartelization of CRM markets with wide-ranging negative economic consequences are not restricted just to producing and exporting countries. Powerful states and private companies have also been responsible for non-transparent pricing mechanisms for many precious CRMs. Global supply chains have become ever more complex due to the blurring of boundaries between physical and financial markets and weakly governed market platforms. These market imperfections lead to the manipulation of prices and threaten the stability of the future security of supply of CRMs.

Given China’s status as the world’s largest battery producer, and as the leading nation in the electrification of the national transport sector, it may increase the dependencies of the European and U.S. carmakers on China. The dependence on CRMs such as lithium, cobalt, graphite, rare earth and others will equally rise. Those geopolitical impacts have already been highlighted in 2010–2011, when China in the midst of escalating diplomatic conflict with Japan stopped all exports of Rare Earth Elements (REEs) to the world’s biggest importer and blackmailed Tokyo diplomatically by instrumentalising its status as the world’s largest producer and exporter of REEs. It has sent a troubling message to the world that the new rising Asian economic and military power might not respect international law, the existing global rules of the WTO and that Beijing may not politically be willing to accept the regional and global responsibilities that grow with its emerging superpower status. Over the last months, China has further strengthened its efforts to control the entire global supply chain of lithium, from owning international mines to the production of lithium up to manufacturing of batteries and EVs.

#### Advanced batteries are key tolasers – they’re key to missile defense and prevent a NoKo first strike

Daniels ‘17 [Jeff Daniels is a reporter for CNBC.com. Previously, he was a coordinating producer for CNBC, based at the network's Los Angeles Bureau. He joined the network in 1999. "Laser weapons developers ‘riding the wave’ created by Tesla, other battery innovators." https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/17/laser-weapons-riding-the-wave-created-by-tesla-battery-innovators.html]

Advances made in automotive battery technology by Tesla and others are now being borrowed to help the Pentagon get high-power laser weapons that can kill everything from enemy drones to missiles.

The work on laser weapons underway includes an Air Force Research Laboratory contract awarded to Lockheed Martin last week to develop high-power fiber lasers that will be tested on a tactical fighter jet by 2021. The fighter jet demonstration project is part of the Air Force lab’s so-called SHiELD or Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator program.

“You can power the laser like you can power the car off a battery system,” said Rob Afzal, senior fellow of laser weapon systems at Lockheed, the nation’s largest defense company. “We would use the same type of battery technology ... and the reason is you need to be able to deliver a lot of energy in a short period of time.”

Indeed, efficient lithium-ion battery technology commonly found in electric cars is now getting leveraged to drive power generation and storage solutions for military laser applications. It allows lasers to achieve significant bursts of energy very quickly for incinerating enemy targets, just as a Tesla Model S driver could accelerate from 0 to 60 miles per hour in a matter of a few seconds.

“As the batteries get smaller, cheaper, have more power density, more reliable, we’re just going to just have better power systems for the laser,” said Afzal. “The battery technology is ahead of the laser weapon technology.”

Some experts credit Tesla for helping bring a revolution in electric cars and lithium-ion battery technology, while also driving down battery costs and expanding the power storage market beyond cars. Even so, the Tesla brand competes with other lithium-ion battery suppliers, and research firm Technavio last year predicted the Chinese would surpass the U.S. in research and development spending on laser systems by 2022.

“It’s funny how a lot of things that happened in the auto industry can filter over into new capabilities on most other technologies, and lasers is one of them,” said Air Force lab’s SHiELD’s program manager Richard Bagnell.

Dan Goure, a former Pentagon official and now senior vice president of Virginia think-tank Lexington Institute, said the Lockheed contract to develop a laser for a fighter jet shows how far the research has come in terms of making laser weapons smaller.

In a release, Lockheed said this month its team will be “focused on developing a compact, high efficiency laser within challenging size, weight and power constraints.” It also said the laser system would be “pod mounted on the tactical fighter jet.”

‘Elon Musk in camouflage’

Yet the challenge comes from the fact that directed-energy weapons — lasers — tend to draw significantly more power than an automotive battery would require. The airborne laser weapons are designed to store power to fire off dozens of shots but can also include a power recharge system much like a hybrid electric car.

“You may literally not have to be generating power per se on the airplane [for laser weapons],” said Goure. “You can have battery storage, kind of like Elon Musk in camouflage. ”

It’s unclear if Musk’s Tesla or its suppliers are providing battery storage systems to the defense contractors for laser weapons. Tesla declined comment for this story.

For its part, Lockheed says it doesn’t use its own specialized battery technology for the lasers but one that’s being developed for automobiles, aircraft and other applications.

‘Riding the wave’

“We’re riding the wave,” said Afzal. “The battery advances are remarkable. We’re going to utilize that.”

Regardless, the military has been researching lethal lasers since the 1960s but in the past decade development has intensified with the focus on technologies that have more power, accuracy and reliability.

“One of the things we find in a lot of our systems — land, sea and air — is that we run out of shots particularly on the defense,” said Goure. “You just run out of bullets or missiles. And if you have laser, it avoids having to reload.”

For the Navy, a drone-killing laser weapon system was deployed a few years ago aboard the amphibious transport ship USS Ponce in the Persian Gulf, although the laser was removed from the ship last summer. In 2018, the Navy is expected to test a 150-kilowatt electric laser weapon. The high-energy laser weapon is being developed by Northrop Grumman to protect ships from drones, boats and enemy missiles.

The Army recently took delivery of a 60-kilowatt laser system from Lockheed that will be put on combat vehicles. Also, in August Lockheed did tests for the Army on a 30-kilowatt Advanced Test High Energy Asset (ATHENA) laser weapon system that shot down five drones. ATHENA is so powerful it can burn a hole in truck from a mile away.

Experts point out that a decade ago, the solid-state laser technology was bigger than many of the combat vehicles. “What’s happened is a new type of electrically-driven laser technology has evolved in the last 10 years where we can build very high power lasers that are very electrically efficient,” said Afzal. “The more efficient the laser you have, the less power you need to drive it.”

Killing missiles

At the same time, automotive industry innovation means laser weapons today are lighter and more portable than legacy chemical iodine lasers that were once tested aboard Boeing’s 747-400 jets for the Air Force.

Chemical lasers can pack a big punch in terms of firepower and shoot down ballistic missiles but are considered impractical and rely on large chemical tanks that can be hazardous in accidents.

Back in 2002, Boeing began testing chemical laser weapons on 747s in a program known as the YAL-1 Airborne Laser Testbed. The flying laser system was designed to shoot down enemy missiles but had mixed success, and the Pentagon pulled the plug on the $5 billion program in 2011. “One of the problems with the chemical laser is that first of all they’re too big and too heavy — and you have to carry the chemicals with you,” said Afzal. “With an electric laser, your platform which is driving, sailing, flying around, usually has a power system that can recharge your battery back. But in a chemical laser, once the chemicals are gone you have to go back to the depot.”

More recently, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has indicated it wants to take another look at airborne laser weapons to kill enemy missiles but rather than use chemical lasers it plans to focus on electric solid-state laser technology.

In June, the agency put out a request for information with defense contractors for a drone equipped with a high-energy laser weapon system would be compact and designed to intercept missiles in the boost phase. That means the technology could one day possibly be used to bring down ballistic missiles fired by North Korea that are a threat to the U.S. or its allies.

#### NoKo first strike causes extinction

Dempsey ‘18 [Michael; 2/21/18; National intelligence fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a fellowship sponsored by the U.S. government. He is the former acting director of national intelligence; War on the Rocks; “What If Kim Jong Un Decides to Bloody America’s Nose First?" https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/kim-decides-bloody-americas-nose-first/]

For the past several decades, North Korea has weathered periodic spikes in U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure while continuing to make steady progress with its weapons programs. North Korean leaders correctly calculated for years that U.S. policymakers would find the cost of an actual conflict on the Peninsula too high for serious consideration, and that China would be a safety valve if economic sanctions became too painful.

From Kim’s vantage point, however, there are reasons to question whether those assumptions are still valid. Over the past year, the public rhetoric from U.S. leaders threatening his regime has reached an unprecedented level, with some statements indicating that the United States is “locked and loaded” for a conflict, and others even hinting at the idea of a nuclear strike against North Korea. At the same time, the United States has quietly increased its military footprint in the region, including more regular B-1 bomber flights over the Korean Peninsula and — for the first time in a decade — the deployment late last year of three U.S. aircraft carriers off the Peninsula. This stepped-up military activity has undoubtedly not been lost on Kim or his generals and has likely sparked internal discussion about potential U.S. offensive military operations.

On the economic front, meanwhile, China has become intensely frustrated by both Kim’s behavior and constant U.S. demands to get tougher on the North, and has gradually imposed increasingly punishing sanctions, agreeing to limit oil supplies and stop importing steel and various food products. This is particularly worrisome to Kim because China accounts for about 90 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade. Taken in combination these actions might convince Kim that the established playbook has fundamentally changed, and that he is now in real danger.

So, how might this realization alter North Korea’s actions? It’s plausible that, contrary to the logic that maximum pressure will force concessions, the North’s new constraints could persuade Kim that he needs to demonstrate his own resolve and preemptively remind the United States and its allies just how costly an attempt at forced denuclearization or regime change would be. Indeed, Pyongyang’s track record suggests a willingness to raise the stakes during periods of tension and to take lethal action — from the seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 to the artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 — when it believes it necessary.

If Kim reaches this conclusion, there are a few options that his regime could consider which U.S. policymakers should prepare now to counter. First, there is the strong possibility of additional missile testing, potentially involving more sophisticated delivery systems and warheads — a standard tactic Kim has employed in recent months to demonstrate his resolve and showcase the North’s newfound technical prowess. I believe the regime is also likely to engage in proportional actions: Recall that when North Korea objected to the release of a Sony film in 2014 that portrayed an assassination attempt on Kim, it responded with a cyberattack on that specific studio. Today, Pyongyang could calculate that it needs to similarly target business interests in South Korea and the U.S. to force an easing of economic sanctions. This would likely be done through a series of cyberattacks against vulnerable commercial targets in both the United States and South Korea, especially banks and key economic infrastructure, but could also involve physical sabotage operations.

Second, if Kim believes that military pressure against the North is reaching an unacceptable level, he could try to intimidate Seoul and undermine its cooperation with Washington. This option could involve using North Korean special forces to trigger a series of isolated explosions in major cities in the South (North Korean special forces have operated in the South in the past) or even another incident similar to the sinking of a South Korean corvette in 2010 (the Cheonan), which the North has repeatedly denied despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Along these lines, Kim could also enlist a “sympathizer group” rather than his own special forces to attack a U.S. or South Korean military installation, calculating this would send the intended message while maintaining some degree of deniability.

And third, if confronted with the threat of a major U.S. military buildup on the Peninsula later this year, Kim may well decide in desperation that his best option is to preemptively target (including with mines) the ports and airfields that the U.S. military would rely on to transport troops into South Korea. If he pursues this option, Kim would almost certainly expect a strong U.S. retaliation, but might calculate that delaying America’s ability to deploy significant ground forces onto the Peninsula is his only remaining option to buy time and is therefore his best military play. Kim has undoubtedly learned the lesson of Desert Storm, and is unlikely to allow the U.S. military to mass hundreds of thousands of troops in the South for an offensive at the time and place of its choosing.

Understanding North Korea’s internal decision-making process and the various influences on Kim’s calculations is perhaps the hardest intelligence challenge on the planet. As is well documented, North Korea is among the most isolated countries in the world, with a young leader with almost no international expertise and only a few years of actual leadership experience. Therefore, it’s quite plausible that Kim himself has yet to decide on a course of action for the current standoff with Washington, and that his decisions will be shaped almost entirely by his superficial perception of U.S. intentions and the perceived threat. Sadly, my experience working on this issue while in government also causes me to believe that Kim is surrounded by advisers who, based on the last quarter-century of U.S.-North Korea relations, may be overconfident that the United States will shy away from conflict in the face of aggressive actions by North Korea. These advisers are unlikely to tell Kim anything he doesn’t want to hear for fear of their own personal safety. In other words, it’s a situation ripe for miscalculation by both sides.

Given the stakes — a potential conflict involving nuclear weapons — a miscalculation leading to a broader conflict simply cannot be allowed to occur. So in the coming months U.S. policymakers will want to exercise prudence in and carefully weigh their public statements, think deeply about how Kim and other critical actors might misperceive and overreact to U.S. actions and rhetoric, work in the closest possible consultation with key regional allies (especially South Korea), and prepare U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic responses to the full range of potential North Korean preemptive actions and counter-actions. It would be nice if the current showdown with North Korea could be resolved through diplomacy and follow a logical, predictable script of American design, but the two countries’ painful shared history suggests that we shouldn’t bank on that occurring.

#### The aff protects international supply chains and allows for rapid economic growth – US antitrust policy is key to ensure private plaintiffs can seek treble damages – any alternative penalty is insufficient because the benefits of price-fixing outweigh the risks

Leonardo ‘16 [Lizl Leonardo; 2016; J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2018; B.S., 2011, De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines; DePaul Law Review; “A Proposal to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce.” vol. 66, https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4008&context=law-review]

The Seventh Circuit ruling also addressed policy arguments that are pertinent in today’s global economy. It held that foreign subsidiaries could bring suit to seek remedies under the laws of the country where they operated, and in light of this, the United States must not overextend its reach. Rather, it should allow foreign countries to govern conduct that occurs exclusively within their borders.343 However, the court failed to consider that allowing a private company to pursue claims under U.S. antitrust law would detect and deter the formation of cartels.344 Treble damages are available under U.S. antitrust law.345 The adversaries of this proposition argue that this would presume the inadequacy of the antitrust laws of foreign countries.346 They argue that foreign countries, with the help of the United States, set up their own antitrust laws and continue to improve these laws throughout the years; thus, these foreign laws must prevail in dealing with foreign anticompetitive conduct.347 While it is true that the United States has taken on a role to help foreign countries develop their own antitrust laws, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling presumes that fines and criminal prosecutions, both here and abroad, are sufficient to deter global cartels.348

The truth is, collective laws across the nations are still inadequate to protect U.S. companies and consumers, primarily because many nations still do not have laws against international price-fixing cartels.349 In fact, only a limited number of countries allow private companies to bring private antitrust claims for damages.350 On the other hand, existing antitrust laws in many other countries are insufficient because the penalties are significantly lower than those in the United States; therefore, this discrepancy fails to deter foreign companies from forming international price-fixing cartels.351 The financial gains from a conspiracy far outweigh the maximum criminal and civil fines imposed by other countries’ antitrust laws.352

The presence of price-fixing conspiracies for products such as LCDs, automotive parts, vitamins, and DRAM illustrate these ineffective antitrust laws.353 Companies engaged in these conspiracies know how the system works and will repeatedly participate in cartels without more rigid rules in place, such as that of the Ninth Circuit’s.354 The Seventh Circuit’s logic seems misplaced when focused on the availability (or the lack thereof) of the laws in foreign countries where the conduct occurred. The antitrust laws of the United States have nothing to do with the adequacy or inadequacy of other countries’ antitrust laws. Rather, they have everything to do with the fact that U.S. consumers were injured.

In Empagran, the U.S. Supreme Court held that extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law should be limited to balance the “legitimate sovereign interests of other nations.”355 One of the fears is that foreign plaintiffs with no relation to domestic commerce would flock to the United States to recover damages, which would be too costly given the already scarce judicial resources.356 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the principle of international comity and brought up the same concern in its Motorola opinion.357 However, the enactment of the FTAIA, particularly the “gives rise to” requirement, already accounts for this concern.358 This second requirement of the FTAIA ensures that all causes of action that have domestic effects to the United States are the proximate causes to those effects.359 Congress, therefore, made sure that unnecessary suits are not filed in U.S. jurisdictions, while not overstepping into another country’s interests.360 In Motorola, it is undisputed that the defendants’ conduct had domestic effects, as the inflated prices paid by the foreign purchases were ultimately passed on to U.S consumers.361 Motorola purchased over $5 billion worth of panels, over fifty percent of which eventually entered U.S. commerce.362 What seems to be a small increase in the price of the panels nonetheless would have a substantial effect on the market.363 Furthermore, the defendants were business executives engaged in global supply chains.364 If they did not already, they should have known that the artificially inflated price of these LCD panels targeted to reach the United States (as alleged by Motorola) would have an impact on the U.S. market.365

Moreover, it does not appear that these cases have raised serious comity concerns; despite the DOJ’s prosecution of the foreign companies and their employees, no foreign government has stepped forward expressing deep concerns about the overreaching enforcement of antitrust law.366 This is not to say that courts must forget about the importance of international comity when analyzing antitrust cases. International comity ensures that the United States does not overstep into foreign countries’ authority when extending the reach of U.S. antitrust laws.367 In fact, the United States has proactively assisted foreign countries in their efforts to capture more anticompetitive conduct.368 However, despite the need to “tread softly” in this arena, the United States must put down its foot and continue to litigate claims of anticompetitive conduct by foreign companies, so long as the foreign anticompetitive conduct satisfies the requirements of the FTAIA.369

Limiting the extent of the FTAIA, as the defendants contended and the Seventh Circuit ruled, would significantly destabilize the enforcement of antitrust law—“a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market structures,” which “is ‘as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.’”370 The Seventh Circuit, in ruling that a “component” is not “direct” enough to provide sufficient basis for liability under the statute, precluded any claim that involved components of finished goods imported into the United States from being brought under the Sherman Act.371 In effect, the court has made a per se rule that claims based on foreign conduct regarding a component of finished goods that eventually reach the United States have no place in the United States’ jurisdiction.372 This sweeping decision has negative ramifications in the detection of cartels, the protection of U.S. consumers, and the development of the international business community.373

The Ninth Circuit’s logic and reasoning should prevail in subsequent cases. It allows for a more rigid, yet necessary, rule in the rapid growth of the economy. By the Ninth Circuit’s logic, foreign cartels that harm U.S. commerce will be reached by U.S. antitrust laws. Treble damages will disincentivize these foreign companies from pursuing anticompetitive conduct; products will not be overpriced as a result of cartels’ price-fixing; transactions among domestic and/or foreign producers will be much smoother because both parties are at ease. U.S. Supreme Court involvement, interpreting how the FTAIA applies to non-import trade, would provide answers to questions that federal courts have been struggling to answer for many years, and it would reverberate the United States’ firm position against conspiracies that adversely impact U.S. consumers and the U.S. economy.

#### \*The aff solves by clarifying the language of the Sherman Act and giving courts guidance on interpreting the FTAIA’s language

Ryu ‘16 [Jae Hyung; Fall 2016; J.D. Candidate (2017), Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri; Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law; “Deterring Foreign Component Cartels in the Age of Globalized Supply Chains,” vol. 17, no. 1, https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get\_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/wakfinp17&section=6]

Resolving these conflicting ideas will be a difficult task because import commerce encompasses a complex web of transactions and implicates multiple aspects of economic policy-making.166 Therefore, Congress, which has not made major amendments to the Sherman Act or the FTAIA since their enactments,167 should clarify the statutes' scopes. As the above mentioned trade data suggest, the world economy is much more interconnected, and other countries have already begun to flex their antitrust muscles outside their borders in the context of price-fixed components.168 Moreover, because many corporations are multinational and thus subject to the corresponding jurisdictions' competitions laws, competition laws are starting to converge, mostly to resemble those of the United States.169 Congress, through its committees, research commissions, and hearings that will elicit expert testimonies, is in the best position to examine in detail which form of antitrust law would best serve the needs of American consumers and businesses.

In doing so, Congress should consider combining the Sherman Act and the FTAIA to clarify the interaction between the two statutes. 1 7 0 Because the FTAIA modifies the Sherman Act, instead of having a distinct section, the FTAIA's language can simply be added to the Sherman Act to make the Sherman Act more self-contained and easily understandable. In revising the statutes, Congress should define the contours of import commerce to provide courts with clearer guidance. Furthermore, considering that one of the major concerns involving a broad reading of the FTAIA is international comity, 172 it is more appropriate for Congress to consider complex foreign relation concerns than for the judiciary. Congress could update U.S. antitrust law in the face of increasing cross-border antitrust collaborations and other countries' practices of expanding extraterritorial applications of antitrust law. 17 3

#### Plan: The United States federal government should increase its prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by expanding the extraterritorial scope of its antitrust laws.

### Harmonization Adv

#### Strengthening cartel responses mitigates the risks of regulatory harmonization – that offsets the costs of globalization and shields consumers

Leonardo ’16 [Lizl Leonardo, J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2018; B.S., 2011, De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines. "A Proposal t oposal to the Se o the Seventh and Ninth Cir enth and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the cuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce." https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4008&context=law-review]

A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of the Seventh Circuit will also prevent companies from potentially leaving the United States to avoid compliance with antitrust laws.417 Domestic companies with foreign subsidiaries that seek to increase their market share by colluding to fix the prices of products will be deterred from engaging in illegal conduct, but they will also be incentivized to keep their businesses in the country.418 Mere knowledge that companies can be liable in the United States for engaging in illegal, extraterritorial conduct that indirectly affects U.S. consumers could in itself discourage the companies from pursuing such conduct.419 Likewise, without the benefit of being exculpated from any extraterritorial conduct, companies will rather stay in the United States than incur expensive costs of moving overseas. This is a win-win situation; prices of products remain controlled by the natural forces of supply and demand, and small and local companies are able to compete with the bigger and international companies. On the contrary, a ruling that limits the extraterritorial reach of the FTAIA to non-import commerce, similar to what the Seventh Circuit held, will encourage companies to move their operations overseas and strategically only deal with the United States in instances they are certain will not subject them to either the Sherman Act or FTAIA.420

Arguably, ruling in favor of the Ninth Circuit could hurt companies that trade with the United States indirectly. These companies have legitimate reasons for incorporating as “foreign subsidiaries,” and subjecting them to U.S. jurisdiction would in effect deplete some of these purposes.421 Although domestic legal remedies are available in some foreign countries, as mentioned above, they are unlikely to deter price-fixing by international cartels.422

Moreover, having a more consistent approach in cases like this will strengthen and harmonize the partnership across nations. Needless to say, the cooperation between these countries can play a significant role in attaining this objective. Bilateral agreements between the countries have proven that, though challenging, implementing this stricter rule is not impossible.423 International trade rules, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and agreements between countries, imply the general acceptance of this proposal.424 The rapid growth in globalization has forced governments to institute and enforce policies that both protect domestic products from multinational firms and encourage the domestic firms to compete internationally, in furtherance of international trade.425

One of the partnerships the European Union (EU) and the U.S. governments are currently working on is called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).426 Its aim is to further develop the strong relationship nations have and leverage that relationship to boost economic growth and international competitiveness.427 The agreement purports to provide greater transparency around trade and investment regulation while ensuring the quality of the products.428 As part of the agreement, the governments seek to eliminate all tariffs, other duties, and charges on trade in various products between the United States and the European Union.429

The proponents of T-TIP point out that the elimination of tariffs and quotas will, among other things, entail lower costs of import to each of the regions, put products from one area “on equal footing” with the products from another, create more jobs, lower the unemployment rate, increase competitiveness, and improve the overall growth of members of the agreement.430 Although the agreement seems ambitious at this time, it intends to link two of the world’s larg est economies to generate a third of the world’s GDP.431 Critics argue, however, that the deregulation of several national laws—possibly resulting in lower consumer standards, as well as compromised laws covering intellectual property, food safety, privacy and data collection, and democratic legitimacy—are all steps in the wrong direction.432

Having an established rule that foreign companies’ non-import trade conduct can be subjected to U.S. antitrust laws, as long as the conduct had an “immediate consequence” on U.S. commerce, could mitigate the risks associated with the opening of U.S. and EU markets. Foreign companies that will be encouraged to invest in the United States as a result of T-TIP will have an understanding of the laws and the possible repercussions of any business transaction in which they take part. These companies do not need to determine if and how any of their strategic decisions can be subjected to either the Seventh or Ninth Circuit rulings before securing deals or signing agreements. The certainty will provide companies with notice and understanding of how the law affects their decisions, thereby making their investments less risky. In return, investments could become safer, eventually having a favorable impact on the continued development of the world economy.

V. CONCLUSION

International commerce has expanded over time. Accordingly, the U.S. courts’ interpretation of antitrust laws must keep up with this rapid growth. It is time to apply a consistent rule that will solve the convoluted body of law and conflicting application of that body of law by the courts. U.S. courts must be able to reach foreign companies’ extraterritorial conduct that have wrongfully affected the U.S. economy. Though international comity may have been a concern in years past, deterrence should bear a greater weight in determining whether a foreign company is subject to the United States’ jurisdiction. After all, antitrust laws are geared towards protecting consumers. Ex panding the reach of the FTAIA to include transactions that occurred outside of the United States, but still have direct and significant effects in the United States, will allow for a more rigid yet necessary rule in the age of increasing international commerce. Consistency across all federal courts will provide foreign companies greater transparency with regard to the laws that govern both their import and non-import trade transactions; formation of cartels will be minimized; price-fixing of products will be easily detected and stopped; innovation and creativity will be encouraged; competition will increase; and prices of goods will likely decrease. Consequently, the United States and the global economy will be favorably impacted.

#### Now is key – regulatory harmonization is around the corner

Moens & Scott 9/9/21 [Barbara Moens, Reporter @POLITICOEurope covering trade and Belgian politics. Mark Scott, Chief Technology Correspondent at POLITICO. "Transatlantic trade deal rises from the grave to fight China." https://www.politico.eu/article/ttip-rises-from-the-grave-to-fight-china/]

Activists may have thought the politically explosive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between Europe and America were dead and buried.

But one of the most important elements of those talks, which collapsed in 2016, is back from the grave: regulatory alignment between Washington and Brussels.

The first meeting of the Trade and Tech Council (TTC) in Pittsburgh on September 29 is intended to build a diplomatic platform for the European Union and the United States to work together on industrial and tech standards to counter China's rise in sectors ranging from microchips and robots to artificial intelligence and the alleged antitrust abuses of Google and Amazon.

The attempt to build a common U.S.-EU front could hardly come at a more sensitive moment politically, as the American retreat from Afghanistan has blown a hole in European faith in the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden. Many in Brussels feel let down by Washington's retreat from that country, while many in the U.S. capital believe EU countries did not pull their weight during the 20-year war.

“You can not discuss the Trade and Tech Council, and transatlantic trade relations overall, without Afghanistan in the back of your mind,” said one EU trade diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the ongoing talks are private. “The trust is gone, and that has to be rebuilt one step at a time.”

The two sides may not find themselves perfectly aligned against the common Chinese foe, however.

Brussels had originally hoped to pressure the Americans into following Brussels’ regulatory line on tech and trade, building on more than a decade of digital policymaking that spanned competition enforcement to global privacy rules. But now, the big fear among European officials is that the EU could well come off second best in this process and cede power to the U.S. after Washington flexed its muscles in early-stage talks around the upcoming trade and tech summit to focus on priorities for Biden's administration.

TTIP through the back door?

The TTIP negotiations are mostly remembered for protests about hormone-treated beef and chemically-rinsed poultry but the major benefits of TTIP lay precisely in bringing together conflicting EU-U.S. regulations. At the time, Brussels described this part of TTIP as a "regulatory cooperation body" and said that it could look at sectors such as data and cybersecurity.

Washington and Brussels now want to target those regulatory benefits again. “That sounds extremely boring and technical, but there’s a lot of money in having different standards. So this has the support from business from both sides,” former EU trade chief Cecilia Malmström told POLITICO earlier this year. Ten working groups — on everything from global trade standards to how to deal with online platforms — are expected to hammer out how such joint transatlantic policymaking could work in practice.

This time around, it’s not just car seatbelts or pharmaceuticals. The discussions focus on critical emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, semiconductors and data governance.

#### Unchecked globalization causes right-wing populism – that causes slow growth, polarization, and war

Flaherty & Rogowski 21 [Thomas M. Flaherty is a PhD candidate and NSF Graduate Fellow at the University of California, San Diego. He can be reached at t1flaher@ucsd.edu. Ronald Rogowski is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Weatherhead Scholar at Harvard University (2019–2021). "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order." https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/rising-inequality-as-a-threat-to-the-liberal-international-order/4CDE05DEB3AB076CE338E1AA4A9C8087]

The openness to trade in goods, services, and factors of production the LIO has so effectively advanced over decades has concentrated real income growth in a very thin layer of workers. While this rise in top-heavy inequality doubtless has other causes, chief among them skill-biased technological innovation, trade openness has contributed mightily, particularly since the “China shock” of 2001;96 and certainly the populist movements that reject the LIO cast openness to trade and migration as the chief villain.

The ways in which rising inequality has threatened the LIO expose lacunae in international political economy's intellectual apparatus—“blind spots” that require remediation. Most importantly, our basic economics are, if not wrong, at least outdated. The field's adherence to classical trade models blinds us to the distributional effects revealed by top-heavy inequality: far more people lost from globalization, and fewer gained, than traditional theories (factor proportions and specific factors) suggested. While economists rapidly updated their trade models to account for the emerging reality of extreme inequality, political science largely stayed the course—and ran the danger, now realized, of misapprehending the domestic politics of globalization.

The trade literature offers three explanations for top-heavy inequality. The “enriched” Heckscher-Ohlin model of Haskel and colleagues shows how only a thin layer of extraordinarily talented individuals within the larger set of high-skill workers unambiguously benefits from a rise in the relative price of a skill-intensive product; the wages of both the less talented high-skill and the low-skill workers stagnate or fall.97 New new trade theory shows how a similarly narrow subset of very large and productive firms, and their employees, absorb the bulk of trade's gains at the expense of all other firms. Finally, economic geography suggests that trade concentrates economic growth in a few large metropolitan regions while inflicting stagnation and decline elsewhere. Each offers a pessimistic view of the politics of globalization in which variously defined superstars gain a far larger share than the society at large.

We validate these theories of top-heavy inequality with data on local election outcomes from as many as twenty-eight countries over twenty-six years. We find that public support for right-populist parties rises dramatically with exposure to imports and immigration, but only in those countries with high top-heavy inequality. The fact that the huge gains from trade and technology have flowed to such a small elite, while earnings in other categories have stagnated, may go far to explain why the antiglobalization movements blame not only crucial elements of the LIO, but increasingly a small and nefarious global elite, for what one politician luridly portrayed as the “carnage” among many regions and sectors of the advanced economies.

That these movements, with rare exceptions, seek relief in restrictions on trade and migration from populist movements of the Right, rather than in redistribution or training, probably owes much to the failure of the political Left to redistribute sufficiently.98 That so much of these parties’ electoral support, both in Europe and in the US, comes from manual workers and former supporters of the political Left lends credence to this conjecture.

The ill effects of rising inequality, however, extend well beyond the rising tide of antiglobalization movements and politicians. They extend to slower economic growth (bound to exacerbate existing resentments), increased political polarization, and even a heightened risk of international conflict.

#### Polarization causes extinction

Lugar and Hamilton 20 [Former Indiana Sen. Richard Lugar (1977–2013) and former Indiana Rep. Lee Hamilton (1965–1999) are distinguished professors of practice at the Hamilton Lugar School of Global & International Studies at Indiana University, A national security imperative: Bipartisan cooperation, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/410146-a-national-security-imperative-bipartisan-cooperation]

Today, while a single existential threat may be gone, the challenges we face now are just as grave and complicated. China and Russia are revisionist powers, looking to overtake the U.S. and set the rules of the road. North Korea has developed a nuclear weapon and missiles to deliver it. Iran may soon decide it needs to restart its nuclear program and continues to sponsor terror throughout the region. The Middle East is a hodgepodge of civil wars and proxy fights between regional and world powers. The European alliance is fraying and democratic freedoms in formerly “safe” democracies are being rolled back. Countries like Venezuela are on the verge of collapse, and allies like Turkey and Hungary are sliding toward dictatorship.

Yet the bipartisan approach to national security has evaporated, boiled away by the same raging political fires that have consumed so many of our domestic issues. The world needs America to present a united front, where our political factions understand we’re better off working together than undercutting each other.

Historically, bipartisan cooperation has improved national security. Returning to that cooperative spirit would make America safer. Sen. Lugar, for instance, worked with his Democratic colleague Sen. Sam Nunn (Ga.) to secure and dismantle the recently-collapsed Soviet Union’s weapons of mass destruction, thereby leaving far fewer of these powerful weapons available to despots and terrorists. Similarly, Rep. Hamilton served with Republican Thomas Keane as Vice Chair and Chair, respectively of the 9/11 Commission, whose findings have helped prevent any other mass terrorist events in the U.S. since that horrible September morning 17 years ago.

#### U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.

Lavin 17 [Frank Lavin is the Chairman of Export Now. He served in the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department during the Reagan, Bush (41) and Bush (43) Administrations. Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. October 20, 2017. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2017/10/20/things-fall-apart-populism-and-foreign-policy]

Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief.

What is Populism?

This populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?

Second, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension.

Third, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances.

Fourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental

to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free.

To be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy?

To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late.

Finally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities.

The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument.

The main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.

#### Trade that doesn’t account for distributional effects drives populism – perceived unfairness outweighs alt causes

Rodrik 17 [Dani Rodrik, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." The National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 23559. July 2017. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23559.pdf]

Globalization had a big upside. It greatly expanded opportunities for exporters, multinational companies, investors, and international banks, as well the managerial and professional classes who could take advantage of larger markets. It helped some poor countries – China in particular – rapidly transform farmers into workers in manufacturing operations for export markets, thereby spurring growth and reducing poverty. But the decline in global inequality was accompanied by an increase in domestic inequality and cleavages. Globalization drove multiple, partially overlapping wedges in society: between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers, employers and employees, globally mobile professionals and local producers, industries/regions with comparative advantage and those without, cities and the countryside, cosmopolitans versus communitarians, elites and ordinary people. It left many countries ravaged by financial crises and their aftermath of austerity.

Globalization was hardly the only shock which gutted established social contracts. By all accounts, automation and new digital technologies played a quantitatively greater role in de-industrialization and in spatial and income inequalities. But globalization became tainted with a stigma of unfairness that technology evaded. People thought they were losing ground not because they had taken an unkind draw from the lottery of market competition, but because the rules were unfair and others – financiers, large corporations, foreigners – were taking advantage of a rigged playing field.

Many of these consequences were predictable and are not a surprise. The same can be said about the political backlash as well. A number of empirical papers have linked the rise of populist movements – Trump and the right-wing Republicans in the U.S., Brexit in Britain, far-right groups in Europe – to forces associated with globalization, such as the China trade shock, rising import penetration levels, de-industrialization, and immigration.

Analyzing electoral results across U.S. congressional districts, Autor et al. (2016) have shown that the China trade shock aggravated political polarization: districts affected by the shock moved further to the right or the left, depending which way they were leaning in the first place. Elected Republicans became more conservative, while elected Democrats became more liberal. For Britain, Becker et al. (2016) find that austerity and immigration impacts both played a role in increasing the Brexit vote, in addition to demographic variables and industrial composition. Also analyzing Brexit, Colantone and Stanig (2016) find a much more direct role for globalization. Using an Autor et al. (2013)- type China trade shock variable, they show regions with larger import penetration from China had a higher Leave vote share. They also corroborate this finding with individuallevel data from the British Election Survey that shows individuals in regions more affected by the import shock were more likely to vote for Leave, conditional on education and other characteristics.

A second paper by Colantone and Stanig (2017) undertakes a similar analysis for fifteen European countries over the 1988-2007 period. It finds that the China trade shock played a statistically (and quantitatively) significant role across regions and at the individual level. A larger import shock is associated with support for nationalist parties and a shift towards radical right-wing parties. Finally Guiso et al. (2017) look at European survey data on individual voting behavior and find an important role for economic insecurity – including exposure to competition from imports and immigrants – in driving populist parties’ growth. The same variables also affect voter turnout: individuals who experience greater economic insecurity are also less likely to show up at the polls. As Guiso et al. (2017) indicate, the latter result suggests that studies that focus on vote shares alone underestimate the importance of these economic drivers, including globalization shocks.

A question that has attracted little interest to date is why the backlash has taken the particular form it has in different countries. Most (but not all) populist movements in the current wave are of the right-wing variety. These emphasize a cultural cleavage, the national, ethnic, religious, or cultural identity of the “people” against outside groups who allegedly pose a threat to the popular will. In the U.S., Donald Trump has demonized at various times the Mexicans, Chinese and Muslims. In Europe, right-wing populists portray Muslim immigrants, minority groups (gypsies or Jews), and the faceless bureaucrats of Brussels as the “other.” An alternative variety of populism revolves around a largely economic cleavage, the wealthy groups who control the economy and define its rules versus the lower income groups without access to power. The original American populism of the late 19th century was of this variety, focusing its opposition on the railroad barons and the Northeastern financial elite. Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign in 2016 took a similar form. In Europe, there are a few left-wing populist movements, of which Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos are the best known. In Latin America, by contrast, populism has long taken mostly a left-wing form. In Figure 5 I provide some systematic evidence on the dynamics of support for populist parties around the world since the 1960s. The figure shows the aggregate vote shares of populist parties in countries with at least one populist party. I distinguish between leftwing and right-wing populists and between Europe and Latin America. (The U.S. presidential election of 2016 is not included.) The appendix discusses data sources and parties/countries covered. What jumps out of Figure 5 is the sharp contrast between the patterns of populism in Europe and Latin America. In Europe, the rise of populism is very recent and swift – from below 5 percent of the vote in the late 1980s to more than 20 percent by 2011-2015. Moreover, this increase is driven exclusively by right-wing parties. The left-wing populist vote share remains throughout well below 5 percent of the aggregate electorate in the countries included. By contrast, left-wing populism has always been strong in Latin America, with vote totals between 15-30 percent. It also has experienced a recent, if less marked, rise. Right-wing populism has remained at very low levels in Latin America. What explains the predominance of right-wing populism in Europe today, compared to the predominance of its left-wing variant in Latin America? To shed some light on this question, it helps to think of the rise of populism as the product of both demand- and supply-side factors at work. On the demand side, the distributional and other economic fault lines created or deepened by globalization generate potential public support for movements that position themselves outside the political mainstream and oppose established rules of the game. But the economic anxiety, discontent, loss of legitimacy, fairness concerns that are generated as a by-product of globalization rarely come with obvious solutions or policy perspectives. They tend to be inchoate and need to be channeled in a particular programmatic direction through narratives that provide meaning and explanation to the groups in question. That is where the supply-side of politics comes in. Populist movements supply the narratives required for political mobilization around common concerns. They present a story that is meant to resonate with their base, the demand side: here is what is happening, this is why, and these are the people who are doing it to you. In Mukand and Rodrik (2017) we provide a model where political conflict can revolve around different axes. There are three different groups in society: the elite, the majority, and the minority. The elite are separated from the rest of society by their wealth. The minority is separated by particular identity markers (ethnicity, religion, immigrant status). Hence there are two cleavages: an ethno-national/cultural cleavage and an income/social class cleavage. These cleavages can be orthogonal or overlapping, producing different patterns of alliances and political outcomes. With some simplification, we can say that populist politicians mobilize support by exploiting one or the other of these two cleavages. The “enemies of the people” are different in each case. Populist who emphasize the identity cleavage target foreigners or minorities, and this produces right-wing populism. Those who emphasize the income cleavage target the wealthy and large corporations, producing left-wing populism. It is reasonable to suppose that the relative ease with which one or the other of these cleavages can be targeted depends on their salience in the everyday experience of voters. In particular, it may be easier to mobilize along the ethno-national/cultural cleavage when society is experiencing an influx of immigrants and refugees with dissimilar cultural and religious identities. Then economic anxiety can be channeled into opposition to these groups. Immigrants and refugees can be presented as competing for jobs, making demands on public services, and reducing public resources available for natives. Indeed, a major source of support for far-right parties in Europe has been the fear that immigration will erode welfare state benefits, a fear that is heightened in countries experiencing austerity and recession (see for example Hatton 2016). Cavaille and Ferwerda (2017) find that support for right-wing populist parties is very responsive to perceived competition with immigrants for in-kind benefits, in their case public housing.

An important implication of this reasoning is that even when the underlying shock is fundamentally economic the political manifestations can be cultural and nativist. What may look like a racist or xenophobic backlash may have its roots in economic anxieties and dislocations.20 The supply-side of politics – the narrative on offer -- matters a great deal. This is a point that is often overlooked in current diagnoses. For example, it is not easy to know whether Trump’s victory represents an economic or cultural phenomenon without disentangling the demand and supply sides – the underlying grievances, on the one hand, and his narrative, on the other.

What about Latin America? The reason that populism took a divergent path in Latin America may be related to the fact that the salient shocks associated with globalization took different forms there. Latin Americans who were affected negatively by globalization experienced it not as immigration or rule by Brussels/Frankfurt, but as rapid trade opening, financial crises, IMF programs, and entry by foreign corporations in sensitive domestic sectors such as mining or public utilities. The anger to be mobilized was against these forces and the domestic groups that supported them. This lent itself to left-wing (economic) populism rather than right-wing (cultural) populism.21 The European exceptions to right-wing populism provide further support to this argument. The two European countries that grew substantial left-wing populist movements – Greece and Spain – bear a certain similarity to Latin America. They were major recipients of capital inflows under the European model of financial globalization, the euro. Once the sudden stop took place, their economies went into a tailspin and unemployment skyrocketed. The shock was then intensified by the presence of a common currency and austerity policies imposed from the outside – a troika made up of the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission. Although all countries in Europe were affected by the euro crisis, Greece and Spain were among the most adversely hit. Greece has yet to recover, and unemployment remains very high in both countries. All this is reminiscent of Latin American boom-and-bust cycles, going back at least to the 1970s. So it is not surprising that the financial crisis and its aftermath in Spain and Greece provided fertile ground for left-wing populists, for similar reasons. The relative weakness of cultural/religious cleavages to be exploited may also play a part in favoring left-wing over right-wing populist movements. In Latin America, the bulk of immigration has been from other Latin American countries or from culturally similar European countries. Within Europe, Spain and Greece once again provide instructive counter-examples. Compare the immigration experience of Spain with that of France, for example (Table 2). Even though Spain has a somewhat larger migrant stock in relation to its population, the majority of Spain’s immigrants come from either Latin America or from advanced European countries.22 In France, by contrast, the largest share (more than 40 percent) of migrants are from Moslem countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey) and an additional 10 percent come from Sub-Saharan Africa. A rightwing populist party (i.e., the National Front) has much more fertile ground in France than in Spain. The U.S. presents a mixed case, combining characteristics of both of these paths. Unlike Europe which had opened up to trade and reached a political settlement supporting it long ago – extensive safety nets in exchange for trade openness – the U.S. experienced increased exposure to imports comparatively recently. And it did so without systematic compensation. So imports (especially from China) and trade agreements (with Mexico, Asian countries) were politically salient issues, around which large number of voters could be mobilized. The financial crisis and the differing fates of large banks versus lowincome homeowners – one bailed out, the other not – engendered anger at the financial elites. At the same time, immigration from Mexico, the threat of radical Muslim terrorism, and lingering racial divides were ripe for political manipulation. In other words, the U.S. presented ample ground for both types of cleavage. Correspondingly, the 2016 presidential elections were contested by major populist movements on both the left and the right, led by Bernie Sanders and Donald Turmp, respectively.

8. Concluding remarks

One conclusion from the preceding discussion is that the simple economics of globalization is not particularly auspicious with respect its political sustainability. This is especially true of the advanced phases of globalization – what I have called elsewhere “hyperglobalization” (Rodrik 2011) – in which the ratio of political/distributive costs to net economic gains is particularly unfavorable. Historically, the unification of national markets has required an unequivocal political project led by a strong central executive. Nothing comparable exists globally, and the European experience provides ample reason to be skeptical that something like that can be achieved even regionally. In a world divided politically, markets face strong centrifugal forces as well.

The global economic arrangements of the immediate post-war era were built around John Maynard Keynes’ insight that sustaining a world economy reasonably hospitable to international trade and investment would require carving up space for domestic macroeconomic management. For Keynes, this meant capital controls in particular, which he viewed not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent feature of the international economic order. The same principle was followed in other domains as well. The GATT regime entailed a thin model of trade integration, not reaching beyond direct border barriers or manufactured imports in advanced economies. It left plenty of room for countries to design their own regulations and industrial policies – and indeed protect “sensitive” sectors (such as agriculture or garments).

The resulting system -- variably called the Bretton Woods compromise or embedded liberalism23 – was a great success. It fostered a large increase in global trade and investment and saw rapid economic development in both the advanced and developing economies. Perhaps it was too successful for its own good. By the late 1980s, policy makers and economists thought they could make it work even better by pushing for deeper economic integration. Trade agreements became more ambitious and reached beyond the border into domestic regulations. The removal of restrictions on capital mobility became the norm rather than the exception. In the process, the “embedding “ or “compromise” that had made the earlier regime such a success was overlooked.

The rise of populism forces a necessary reality check. Today the big challenge facing policy makers is to rebalance globalization so to maintain a reasonably open world economy while curbing its excesses.

## 2ac

### k

#### They’re responsible for matching up the scope of alt solvency with the scope of their impacts. Presenting concrete solutions improves the alt’s critical purchase and avoids cooption.

Visoka, 19—Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University (Gëzim, “Critique and Alternativity in International Relations,” International Studies Review, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2019, 678-704, dml)

Critical IR theory needs to make more space for self-reflexivity and to open up to an epistemic transformation. The preceding discussion demonstrated that although peace and conflict studies are more pluralist than other critical IR branches, they are still affected by paradigmatic and disciplinary divides within IR. They operate in a conflictual theorizing logic that disregards certain ontological, methodological, and epistemological alternatives in order to remain loyal to one particular disciplinarity. For Laura Sjoberg (2017, 163–67), “disciplinarity has a narrowing effect,” suggesting that “an undisciplined IR would free space for more radical critique and more radical experimentation.” Disciplinary encampment among different branches of critical IR has suffocated the search for achievable emancipatory possibilities across a different range of cases. Endorsing alternativity requires a fluid onto-epistemology that would make it possible to bypass the epistemological entrapments caused by rigid academic rules of thought and of knowledge production and by the academic research process. Nonconflictual pathways of research would be beneficial for overcoming paradigmatic contempt, bypassing methodological holism and individualism, and making space for conciliatory heuristics and reality-congruent inquires (see Archer 1995; Hamati-Ataya 2018). Searching for nonconflictual critiques that are embedded in postparadigmatic logic means generating conceptually novel and reality-congruent knowledge about conflict-affected societies and the broader politics of international interventions. This should not be seen as an attempt to discipline the discipline of peacebuilding studies. On the contrary, it would be an attempt to break away from disciplinary entrenchments that have impeded a better understanding of complexity in postconflict societies. It would also be an attempt to avoid the normalization of entrenched research programs and open up the politics of knowledge production on peace, conflict, security, justice, and development.

More broadly, alternativity in critical IR theory needs to be rescued from never-ending conceptual reifications, which have ended up making ontological assentation about the world become completely detached from the world. In this regard, there is a growing realization in IR that “critique is a necessary but secondary task; the priority is to return to practical theory as quickly as possible” (Levine 2012, 69). Recalibrating the purpose of alternativity in critical theory requires recalibrating knowledge production, not only to unmask power relations and the dynamics of dominance and to create space for a politics of resistance but also to generate practical knowledge for political action that challenges, confronts, and disrupts existing power relations and offers alternative solutions for reshuffling social relations on more emancipatory and inclusive terms (see Duvall and Varadarajan 2003, 85; Murdie 2017; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). A feature of critical peace and conflict studies is a congruence between the emancipatory and problem-solving perspectives, which should be predicated on the conciliation of knowledge, the expansion of onto-politics of peace, and the pluralization of epistemological and methodological approaches. The recent methodological work by J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg (2017) on interpretive quantification is a promising move toward this much-needed pluralist fertilization within critical theory. In particular, a stronger linkage between criticality, alternativity, and practicality could help critical security, peace, and conflict theories to offer alternatives that would maintain critical impetus while simultaneously strengthening ties to practical and societal problem-addressing solutions. Genealogical studies would blend well with a critical analysis of conceptual and policy alternatives (see Milliken 1999). Statistical analysis with an emancipatory hypothesis coupled with critical analysis would contribute to subverting policy practices and would normalize alternative knowledge about peace, justice, and emancipation.

The recent practice-turn in IR offers new bridges between scholars and practitioners, making it possible to translate critical knowledge into practice without compromising the normativity and criticality of scholarly works (see Bigo 2011). A forum on pragmatism published in this journal has implicitly highlighted the importance of alternativity in understanding global politics and generating impactful knowledge beyond the existing epistemological and methodological divides (see Hellmann 2009). Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 701) have argued for “the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge.” Practicality is essential for generating alternatives. For instance, Jonna Nyman (2016, 142) argues that “a pragmatic, practice-centred approach . . . can help us gain practical knowledge of how security works and understand the value of security better, as well as help us to suggest alternative possibilities.” Similarly, Navnita Chadha Behera (2016, 154) argues: “theorizing in IR needs to step out of the rarefied atmosphere of its academe, develop a healthy scepticism toward its canonical frames, and open up to the possibilities of learning from everyday life and experiences of people and their living traditions and practices.” Practicality shifts the focus from abstract criticality and normativity to contextual critiques that account for everyday practices and interactions. This would be essential for rescuing critique from becoming a postempirical endeavor.

Critical knowledge that engages with policy alternatives “is not only pragmatic, it is also politically enabling: it forces us away from instrumental problem-solving perspectives towards a wider framework of pragmatic thought where narrow instrumental goals are overridden by wider normative and political concerns” (Kurki 2013, 260). Such grounded critiques are crucial in order to expand non-prescriptive alternativity and exploring practical possibilities for social emancipation and change. For Steve Smith (2002: 202), “the acid test for the success of alternative and critical approaches is the extent to which they have led to empirically grounded work that explores the range and variety of world politics.” This would also be congruent with Daniel Levine's (2012, 30) concept of sustainable critique, which entails thinking in both practical and critical terms at once so that “IR could create a sustainably critical perspective on global politics that might then be turned back onto, and made to inform, ongoing policy debates and discourses.” Behera (2016, 154) further maintains that the “state-centric ontology of IR has effectively ended up dehumanizing the discipline in a way so that normally it has little to do with human relations, human needs, and the larger imperatives of humanity.” Generating practical alternatives would therefore require endorsing situated knowledge as an epistemological and methodological basis for any engagement with the real world. The work of feminists such as Donna Haraway (1988, 584) on situated standpoints is also relevant here because they offer “more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world.” Situated knowledge is, mostly, nonrepresentational knowledge, in that it is not firmly mediated through preexisting discourses. In this regard, promoting subjugated knowledge discourses and practices could be central to rejuvenating the emancipatory commitment of critical theory (see Doty 1996).

Situated alternatives could derive from emplaced and embodied knowledge and could have a more emancipatory character as they “bring forth the importance of recognizing, valuing, and employing marginalized voices by working from this perspective, as well as by reshaping research to include marginalized communities as part of knowledge production” (McHugh 2015, 62). For Robson and McCartan (2016, 3), “real world research looks to examine personal experience, social life and social systems, as well as related policies and initiatives. It endeavours to understand the lived in reality of people in society and its consequences.” Milja Kurki's (2013, 245) recent study of democracy promotion has approached alternativity from the perspective of policy provocations, which focus “on not prioritising one or another perspective, but rather on encouraging self-reflection by all practitioners, which in turn is considered as a key condition of seeking adequately pluralism-fostering reforms in concrete policy frameworks.” Kurki (2013, 248–51) further maintains that “instead of relying on objective knowledge and criteria, policy process can and should be attuned to the logic of interpretive, politicised and participatory judgements.” Her study is an excellent example of pragmatic congruence between criticality and alternativity, whereby policy alternatives are not geared toward totally improving or enhancing the current system but openly promote more pluralistic, reflexive, and emancipatory policies for democratization and peacebuilding.

Moreover, for these new grounds of critical alternativity to be introduced in practice, knowledge production should be decentered, decolonized, and “de-methodolised” (see Lisle 2014). R. B. J. Walker (2002, 265) has argued that “the key achievement of supposedly alternative and critical literatures over the past two decades has been to open up at least some possibility of asking questions about the location and character of the political.” As elaborated in this study, knowledge production in peace and conflict studies is predominantly based on Western epistemologies, which are shaped by specific cultures of thought, self-perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices. Most of the international scholarship on postconflict societies derives from an unrepresentative body of knowledge, which tries to mediate, deviate, reinterpret, and, consequently, construct a different social reality that is interpreted through different measurements, reference points, and analytical concepts (see Latour 2005). This has greatly limited the possibility for proposing realizable alternatives. Due to these epistemological anomalies, there are growing calls in scholarship to decolonize knowledge from Eurocentric and Western dominance and instead to pursue more pluralist and particularist modes of knowledge (Smith 2012). For instance, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 2) have argued that IR theory should be “an open domain into which it is not unreasonable to expect non-Westerners to make a contribution at least proportional to the degree that they are involved in its practice.” Similarly, Andrew Hurrell (2016, 151) has proposed that “the pathway to a global IR will need to look beyond ‘IR’ and is likely to require new models for organizing social science research and knowledge production.” Decolonized epistemologies of peace would reverse the order of knowledge, placing the local first and then the regional and international as spatial and ontological scales for understanding peace processes (Visoka 2017). They would not operate in isolation but would engage in shaping global IR knowledge. Therefore, a genuine search for achievable alternatives should try to decolonize peace knowledge from Western and Eurocentric frameworks, interrogate decolonized knowledge and agencies, and explore the joint constitution of international intervention and local resistance (see Smith 2012; Memmi 2006). Local scholars often have rich knowledge, but the primary usage of it is not for instrumental purposes or for transferring and sharing with audiences of outsiders. Local knowledge is very much used to respond to narrow practical and everyday interests and needs and, as such, is embedded in the logic of generating sufficient knowledge to respond to specific circumstances.

In the context of peacebuilding, as examined in this article, generating alternatives from the ground up has the potential to bring about more sustainable forms of peace and reconciliation for groups and societies affected by violent conflict. Situated alternatives for emancipatory peace are more prone to avoiding co-optation by positivist and problem-solving epistemic predators, resulting thus in developing pluriversal political and peace orders beyond liberal peacebuilding and other Eurocentric impositions. From this situated perspective, emancipation could take the shape of “the transformation of structures and relationships of vulnerability through localized political action, aimed at the creation of spaces in people's lives so that they are enabled to make decisions and act beyond mere survival” (Basu and Nunes 2013, 69). Emancipatory alternatives would not be universal in their applications because such an attempt is not viable. Rather the focus should be on searching for practical emancipatory possibilities within a given context, time, space, and place (see Fierke 2007, 24). In other words, critiques with an adequate dose of alternativity are more likely to generate globally understandable and locally impactful knowledge. Nevertheless, alternativity does not necessarily have to be predicated on representative views of the world—it can also be a by-product of performing hope and imagined possibilities in global politics. Shapiro (2013, xiv) argues that critical thinking helps to “create the conditions of possibility for imaging alternative worlds.” That said, as the purpose of critical theory is emancipatory change, any alternative theoretical and empirical observation in service of improving the human conditions should generate a morally and practically acceptable standpoint. Because any attempt to establish an alternative interpretation inevitably “empowers a particular social and political standpoint” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 261). According to Ní Mhurchú and Shindo (2016, 5), “critique can help us to develop different ways of talking about, evaluating, doing and interrogating the changing nature of politics, relations and experiences of the international in a globalising world.” Hence, critique is inevitably implicated in world-making and, with a much clearer understanding of alternativity, can steer the thrust for world-changing in a more emancipatory, just, and inclusive direction.

Conclusion

Emancipation is a central feature of critical IR debates, but scholars often fail to develop alternatives or solutions achieving emancipation in practice. This article has examined the relationship between criticality and alternativity in IR in order to shed light on some of the most contested issues of critical theory, namely, the epistemological pathways for identifying the inconsistencies and flaws in existing knowledge and practices and the extent to which critical knowledge should generate alternative emancipatory possibilities. The article has argued that alternativity provides an opportunity for critical scholars to remain relevant without being affiliated with positivist logics of inquiry. In unpacking the conceptual contours, the article first explored how different branches of critical IR engage with the episteme of alternativity. The analysis found that although alternativity is often affiliated with problem-solving epistemologies, it has played a major role in shaping critical knowledge in IR. While this is acknowledged and endorsed at the epistemological level by a branch of critical scholars who engage in normative and reconstructive modes of critique, other scholars embedded in deconstructive modes of critique have disregarded the merits of alternativity in IR. The article has argued that, contrary to what is often assumed, alternativity is not incompatible with deconstructive or reconstructive critiques across different subdisciplines of IR. Yet critical IR debates, which have now become the new mainstream in IR, have failed to engage with the episteme of alternativity in a more empirical and practical sense. They preach emancipation but fail to develop tangible emancipatory alternatives.

As a result, there is a growing realization that, without tangible alternativity, critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment, potentially becoming a post-epistemological vocation without politics. Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside, thus missing the opportunity to transform the structural, discursive, and performative practices that reproduce violence, inequality, and injustice on human and nonhuman ecology. To bridge this epistemological gap, the analysis in the second part of this article examined how alternativity features in peace and conflict studies, a disciplinary field known for adding normative, empirical, and practical substance to critical IR debates. The analysis offered a conceptual scoping of three modes of critique and alternativity in peace and conflict studies. The three modes of critique showed that a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible and that it is necessary to renew the practical and emancipatory potential of critical theory in IR. The three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies expose a spectrum of different critiques, ranging from those perspectives that disengage completely from conceptual and empirical alternatives, to more pragmatic and prescriptive approaches.

Critique-without-alternative represents one strand, which tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique is committed to revealing the weaknesses of peacebuilding interventions but refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative on how to build sustainable peace after violent conflict. If the end goal of critical perspectives is achieving emancipation, then critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements. In turn, the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order.

In response to this challenge, a new mode of critique has emerged, namely, critique-as-alternative, which exemplifies the optimal approach. Proponents of critique-as-alternative have remained committee to critical analysis, but most importantly, they have taken up the challenge of offering emancipatory knowledge that has practical relevance for vulnerable societies in global politics. Their main flaw, however, has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives—a flaw that has opened up space for epistemic contestation and policy co-optation. Finally, the third mode of critique—critique-with-alternative—which is embedded in a positivist, problem-solving, and policy-driven logic of inquiry, offers alternatives that seek either to verify existing knowledge and the existing interventionary order or to reject other critical alternatives.

Looking at different modes of critique through the lens of alternativity in IR's subdiscipline of peace and conflict studies has provided interesting insights on the promise and limits of critical IR in shaping global politics. The analysis found that existing modes of critique have failed to develop elaborative emancipatory alternatives at both the conceptual and the practical levels. To infuse critique-with-alternative with emancipatory elements, expand the epistemological scope of critique-without-alternative, and operationalize further the practical solutions offered by this mode of critique, substantial changes are needed. This article has suggested exploring postparadigmatic approaches of inquiry in order to avoid existing epistemological entrapments and limitations, reclaiming the practical relevance of critical theory through pragmatic, reflexive, and situated alternatives—across the conceptual, normative, and empirical spectrums—and promoting decolonized, bottom-up methods of knowledge production. The existing modes of critique require pursuing more nonconflictual and postparadigmatic epistemologies, embracing situated knowledge and reclaiming and expanding its practical relevance, breaking away from geo-epistemological hierarchies, and opening up to post-Western IR. To conclude, promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The next challenge for scholars should not be whether alternativity and criticality are congruent but how emancipatory alternatives can renew the social and political purpose of critical theory and make an impact in the real world.

#### VTL is subjective---life is a prerequisite

Lisa Schwartz 2, Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 2002, “Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach,” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

#### Long term trends are driving decoupling---growth is sustainable and self correcting

Brook et al. 15—professor of environmental sustainability at the University of Tasmania (Barry, with John Asafu-Adjaye, University of Queensland, Linus Blomqvist, Breakthrough Institute, Stewart Brand, Long Now Foundation, Ruth DeFries, Columbia Univeristy, Erle Ellis, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Christopher Foreman, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, David Keith, Harvard University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Martin Lewis, Stanford University, Mark Lynas, Cornell University, Ted Nordhaus, Breakthrough Institute, Roger Pielke, Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder, Rachel Pritzker, Pritzker Innovation Fund, Joyashree Roy, Jadavpur University, Mark Sagoff, George Mason University, Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough Institute, Robert Stone, Filmmaker, and Peter Teague, Breakthrough Institute, “AN ECOMODERNIST MANIFESTO,” [http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto/](about:blank), dml)

Intensifying many human activities — particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement — so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty. Although we have to date written separately, our views are increasingly discussed as a whole. We call ourselves ecopragmatists and ecomodernists. We offer this statement to affirm and to clarify our views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the service of creating a good Anthropocene. 1. Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters. Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. Personal, economic, and political liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. Historically large numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive. There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. 2. Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just 1 to 3 percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends. 3. The processes of decoupling described above challenge the idea that early human societies lived more lightly on the land than do modern societies. Insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies supported vastly smaller populations. In fact, early human populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today. Consider that a population of no more than one or two million North Americans hunted most of the continent’s large mammals into extinction in the late Pleistocene, while burning and clearing forests across the continent in the process. Extensive human transformations of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three-quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the Industrial Revolution. The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human die-off, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster. Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them: people who depend on firewood and charcoal for fuel cut down and degrade forests; people who eat bush meat for food hunt mammal species to local extirpation. Whether it’s a local indigenous community or a foreign corporation that benefits, it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature. Conversely, modern technologies, by using natural ecosystem flows and services more efficiently, offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere. To embrace these technologies is to find paths to a good Anthropocene. The modernization processes that have increasingly liberated humanity from nature are, of course, double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either. It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems in distant places –– the extraction of natural resources has been globalized. But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history. Decoupling human well-being from the destruction of nature requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy. In other cases, humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy. Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment, allowing more room for non-human species. Suburbanization, low-yield farming, and many forms of renewable energy production, in contrast, generally require more land and resources and leave less room for nature. These patterns suggest that humans are as likely to spare nature because it is not needed to meet their needs as they are to spare it for explicit aesthetic and spiritual reasons. The parts of the planet that people have not yet profoundly transformed have mostly been spared because they have not yet found an economic use for them — mountains, deserts, boreal forests, and other “marginal” lands. Decoupling raises the possibility that societies might achieve peak human impact without intruding much further on relatively untouched areas. Nature unused is nature spared. 4. Plentiful access to modern energy is an essential prerequisite for human development and for decoupling development from nature. The availability of inexpensive energy allows poor people around the world to stop using forests for fuel. It allows humans to grow more food on less land, thanks to energy-heavy inputs such as fertilizer and tractors. Energy allows humans to recycle waste water and desalinate sea water in order to spare rivers and aquifers. It allows humans to cheaply recycle metal and plastic rather than to mine and refine these minerals. Looking forward, modern energy may allow the capture of carbon from the atmosphere to reduce the accumulated carbon that drives global warming. However, for at least the past three centuries, rising energy production globally has been matched by rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Nations have also been slowly decarbonizing — that is, reducing the carbon intensity of their economies — over that same time period. But they have not been doing so at a rate consistent with keeping cumulative carbon emissions low enough to reliably stay below the international target of less than 2 degrees Centigrade of global warming. Significant climate mitigation, therefore, will require that humans rapidly accelerate existing processes of decarbonization. There remains much confusion, however, as to how this might be accomplished. In developing countries, rising energy consumption is tightly correlated with rising incomes and improving living standards. Although the use of many other material resource inputs such as nitrogen, timber, and land are beginning to peak, the centrality of energy in human development and its many uses as a substitute for material and human resources suggest that energy consumption will continue to rise through much if not all of the 21st century. For that reason, any conflict between climate mitigation and the continuing development process through which billions of people around the world are achieving modern living standards will continue to be resolved resoundingly in favor of the latter. Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world's people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges. Meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technological challenge. By this we mean that even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation. Absent profound technological change **there is no credible path to meaningful climate mitigation**. While advocates differ in the particular mix of technologies they favor, we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts. The specific technological paths that people might take toward climate mitigation remain deeply contested. Theoretical scenarios for climate mitigation typically reflect their creators’ technological preferences and analytical assumptions while all too often failing to account for the cost, rate, and scale at which low-carbon energy technologies can be deployed. The history of energy transitions, however, suggests that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality (i.e., less carbon-intensive, higher-density) fuels for lower-quality (i.e., more carbon-intensive, lower-density) ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future. Transitioning to a world powered by zero-carbon energy sources will require energy technologies that are power dense and capable of scaling to many tens of terawatts to power a growing human economy. Most forms of renewable energy are, unfortunately, incapable of doing so. The scale of land use and other environmental impacts necessary to power the world on biofuels or many other renewables are such that we doubt they provide a sound pathway to a zero-carbon low-footprint future. High-efficiency solar cells produced from earth-abundant materials are an exception and have the potential to provide many tens of terawatts on a few percent of the Earth’s surface. Present-day solar technologies will require substantial innovation to meet this standard and the development of cheap energy storage technologies that are capable of dealing with highly variable energy generation at large scales. Nuclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy. However, a variety of social, economic, and institutional challenges make deployment of present-day nuclear technologies at scales necessary to achieve significant climate mitigation unlikely. A new generation of nuclear technologies that are safer and cheaper will likely be necessary for nuclear energy to meet its full potential as a critical climate mitigation technology. In the long run, next-generation solar, advanced nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion represent the most plausible pathways toward the joint goals of climate stabilization and radical decoupling of humans from nature. If the history of energy transitions is any guide, however, that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits. Hydroelectric dams, for example, may be a cheap source of low-carbon power for poor nations even though their land and water footprint is relatively large. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage can likewise provide substantial environmental benefits over current fossil or biomass energies. The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies, both within nations and between them, though international collaboration and competition, and within a broader framework for global modernization and development. 5. We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being. Humans will always materially depend on nature to some degree. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. The case for a more active, conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments. Current and future generations could survive and prosper materially on a planet with much less biodiversity and wild nature. But this is not a world we want nor, if humans embrace decoupling processes, need to accept. What we are here calling nature, or even wild nature, encompasses landscapes, seascapes, biomes and ecosystems that have, in more cases than not, been regularly altered by human influences over centuries and millennia. Conservation science, and the concepts of biodiversity, complexity, and indigeneity are useful, but alone cannot determine which landscapes to preserve, or how. In most cases, there is no single baseline prior to human modification to which nature might be returned. For example, efforts to restore landscapes to more closely resemble earlier states (“indigeneity”) may involve removing recently arrived species (“invasives”) and thus require a net reduction in local biodiversity. In other circumstances, communities may decide to sacrifice indigeneity for novelty and biodiversity. Explicit efforts to preserve landscapes for their non-utilitarian value are inevitably anthropogenic choices. For this reason, all conservation efforts are fundamentally anthropogenic. The setting aside of wild nature is no less a human choice, in service of human preferences, than bulldozing it. Humans will save wild places and landscapes by convincing our fellow citizens that these places, and the creatures that occupy them, are worth protecting. People may choose to have some services — like water purification and flood protection — provided for by natural systems, such as forested watersheds, reefs, marshes, and wetlands, even if those natural systems are more expensive than simply building water treatment plants, seawalls, and levees. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution. Environments will be shaped by different local, historical, and cultural preferences. While we believe that agricultural intensification for land-sparing is key to protecting wild nature, we recognize that many communities will continue to opt for land-sharing, seeking to conserve wildlife within agricultural landscapes, for example, rather than allowing it to revert to wild nature in the form of grasslands, scrub, and forests. Where decoupling reduces pressure on landscapes and ecosystems to meet basic human needs, landowners, communities, and governments still must decide to what aesthetic or economic purpose they wish to dedicate those lands. Accelerated decoupling alone will not be enough to ensure more wild nature. There must still be a conservation politics and a wilderness movement to demand more wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes will require a deeper emotional connection to them. 6. We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. Technological progress is not inevitable. Decoupling environmental impacts from economic outputs is not simply a function of market-driven innovation and efficient response to scarcity. The long arc of human transformation of natural environments through technologies began well before there existed anything resembling a market or a price signal. Thanks to rising demand, scarcity, inspiration, and serendipity, humans have remade the world for millennia. Technological solutions to environmental problems must also be considered within a broader social, economic, and political context. We think it is counterproductive for nations like Germany and Japan, and states like California, to shutter nuclear power plants, recarbonize their energy sectors, and recouple their economies to fossil fuels and biomass. However, such examples underscore clearly that technological choices will not be determined by remote international bodies but rather by national and local institutions and cultures. Too often, modernization is conflated, both by its defenders and critics, with capitalism, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions. What we refer to when we speak of modernization is the long-term evolution of social, economic, political, and technological arrangements in human societies toward vastly improved material well-being, public health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom. Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty and hard agricultural labor, women from chattel status, children and ethnic minorities from oppression, and societies from capricious and arbitrary governance. Greater resource productivity associated with modern socio-technological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature. Modernizing processes are far from complete, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. Decoupling of human welfare from environmental impacts will require a sustained commitment to technological progress and the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. Accelerated technological progress will require the active, assertive, and aggressive participation of private sector entrepreneurs, markets, civil society, and the state. While we reject the planning fallacy of the 1950s, we continue to embrace a strong public role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards. And international collaboration on technological innovation and technology transfer is essential in the areas of agriculture and energy.

#### Growth is sustainable, physical limits aren’t absolute, AND resource use is declining now---the alt unleashes global disaster

Bailey 18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth."

Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity.

Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person.

On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent.

So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita.

On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent).

On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita.

Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively.

The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306.

"Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer.

O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century.

Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields.

O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air.

Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass.

And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities.

After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.

#### Extinction’s inevitable---only growth can sustain space colonization and solve extinction

**Skran 16** [Dale Skran is Executive Vice President of the National Space Society and a member of the Board of Directors of the Alliance for Space Development. “Settling space is the only sustainable reason for humans to be in space,” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2915/1>]

As robotic and artificial intelligence technologies improve and enable increasingly robust exploration without a human presence, eventually there will be only one sustainable reason for humans to be in space: settlement. Research into the recycling technology required for long-term off-Earth settlements will directly benefit terrestrial sustainability. Actively working toward developing and settling space will make available mineral and energy resources for use on Earth on a vast scale. Finally, space settlement offers the hope of long-term species survival that remaining on Earth does not. There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. However, a recent essay by Astro Teller, head of Google X Labs, and his wife Danielle, a physician and researcher takes the bold position that “It’s completely ridiculous to think that humans could live on Mars.” This essay, published by Quartz, repeats with little examination some of the hoariest arguments against space settlement. To support this view, the Tellers quote their 12-year-old daughter: “I can’t stand that people think we’re all going to live on Mars after we destroy our own planet.” This quote contains two mischaracterizations that demand refutation: that “we are all” going to live in space and that we are going to live in space after we destroy Earth. Another canard that has long floated about was given form by the recent film Elysium starring Matt Damon: the rich will leave the poor on the Earth and escape to space settlements. Upon examination, all three of these ideas are strawmen. There are more than seven billion people on the Earth today. No rational space settlement advocate suggests that any significant portion of that population, or even of those who are rich, will be moving to Mars or anywhere else in space. Instead, we expect that relatively small numbers of highly qualified individuals, or those who are deeply dedicated to living in space, would form the first settlements. Over a significant period of time, thousands more from the Earth would join those settlements as they become increasingly self-sufficient. Over more time, various possible niches for settlement (Moon, Mars, asteroids, free space, etc.) will be occupied, and eventually the population in space will total many millions, most of whom will have been born in space. So why then do Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and many others, including organizations like the National Space Society (NSS) and Alliance for Space Development, believe strongly that space settlement is essential to human survival? Although this may seem surprising, the Earth is not a “safe space.” The destiny of virtually all species on Earth is extinction in a relatively short span of geologic time. The Tellers claim that “we live on a planet that is perfect for us.” This statement is both completely true and total nonsense. We fit well on the Earth because we have evolved over millions of years to become creatures that are both adapted to live here and to like living here. It is truer to say that we are perfect for the Earth than the reverse. In fact, the Earth is not such a commodious place. It is subject to periodic calamities of various sorts, ranging from massive asteroid and comet impacts to titanic volcanic eruptions, and from periodic ice ages to disastrous solar flares. In the short run, the Earth seems balmy and comfortable. Viewed from the perspective of deep time, it starts to look more like a death trap, bedeviled by regular mass extinctions. However, things are actually quite a bit worse. Although there are many potentially bad things that might happen to the human race on the Earth from natural sources, there are many more from unnatural sources. We have been dancing with nuclear disaster for a long time. An apocalyptic atomic war is not inevitable, but it is possible. Add to this scenario the genetically engineered killer virus, “gray goo,” a robot revolt, and other horrors as yet undreamt, and the odds against human survival get longer. Hence, the need to abandon the fiction of Earth as our eternal and unchanging perfect home and to appreciate both the need for, and promise of, space settlement. Not so the rich can escape to an Elysium in the sky, or so we can all leave behind a polluted and overheated Earth, but simply so that the human species and human culture has a chance at surviving and flourishing in the long term. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. The Tellers write, “We haven’t even colonized the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans… because it makes no economic sense.” This may be true, but it also makes no sense to settle the Sahara desert, the bottom of the oceans, or Antarctica since these locations are on the Earth, and humans living there will not increase the probability of species survival. Near-Earth free space settlements and lunar bases are just stepping stones to ones much further out that are quarantined from Earth by millions of kilometers of vacuum. Once the motivation of species survival is put front and center, it becomes clear that a settlement in low Earth orbit, on the Moon, at L5, or on the Martian surface is not nearly sufficient. What is needed is a large set of thriving communities distributed throughout the solar system, and even ultimately in the Oort Cloud surrounding the solar system proper. This vision is not a small thing. It will be the work of many generations, just as was the settling of the New World or, even earlier in history, the human diaspora out of Africa along the Asian coast to Australia and beyond. The Tellers believe that sustainability on the Earth has no relationship to what we do in space, but the same technologies that enable deep space settlement will have a profound impact on terrestrial sustainability. Space settlements, of necessity, push the limits of food production per square meter and per liter of water. Space settlement agricultural methods can also be applied to growing food in parched California or in vertical farms in crowded urban areas. Space settlements require humans and technology to co-exist in close proximity. This implies an absolute minimization of pollution and sustained recycling of all waste. Such technologies seem highly applicable to sustainability on Earth as well. We will need to provide the best possible medical care for remote space settlements, which will be far from hospitals on Earth. The technologies that make such medicine effective—“tricorders”, telemedicine, and so on—can also bring medical care to underdeveloped and underserved areas of the Earth. The Tellers raise the specter of “winter-over syndrome” in the Antarctic, writing that “living on Mars would be way, way more miserable than living in Antarctica,” and concluding, “Nobody wants to live there.” Although it is clear that the Tellers will not be going, the large numbers who signed up for Mars One’s sketchy settlement plans suggest that a lot of people do want to live on Mars. There are real challenges to constructing space settlements, but current Antarctic bases are not true settlements. Nobody lives there with their families, with the exception of the coastal Esperanza Base, where about ten families routinely winter over. No real effort is made to create any kind of human environment that is comfortable over a long period of time. Conditions in Antarctica might be better compared to living in a campground than a self-sustaining settlement. Additionally, the current Antarctic Treaty essentially prevents any extraction or use of the natural resources found there, thus making economically independent settlements infeasible. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Let us not shy from the truth. Conditions in the early settlements in the New World were difficult at best, and the casualty rate was high. We should expect the same to hold true for early space settlements. However, Jamestown and Plymouth gave rise to vast cities and a tamed landscape on a scale of hundreds of years. We now bring to the table technological means that would seem magical to the Jamestown settlers. Even as difficult an environment as the Moon can be developed and settled using technology that either exists currently or is an engineering project, as one book suggests. The Tellers think that, from an economic perspective, “Mars has nothing to offer in return.” Here, at least in the short run, they have a point. Although Mars may have more of the natural resources a settlement will need than, say, the Moon, it is at the bottom of a fairly steep gravity well and, for the time being, it is not likely that there will be many Mars-to-Earth exports. However, this is like looking at the resources of the New World via a keyhole, seeing a swamp, and reporting back that there is no point in going there. It is worth keeping in mind the example of “Seward’s Folly.” The purchase of Alaska from Russia was mocked as “Seward’s icebox” and a “polar bear garden.” At the time, the oil and mineral riches of Alaska were undiscovered and undreamt of. Space itself teems with valuable resources, including continuous and abundant solar energy and mineral wealth on a scale beyond imagination just in the near Earth asteroids. Just as the Tellers were dismissing space resources as irrelevant, the US Congress was laying the legal groundwork for asteroid and lunar mining with the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, signed by President Obama on November 23, 2015. The Tellers also seem unaware that their leadership at Google, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt, are investors in the asteroid mining firm Planetary Resources. The Tellers say that “we won’t survive [on Earth] unless we learn to live in a resource neutral way.” This statement assumes that that Earth is a closed system, which it is not. The Earth is flooded daily with vast amounts of solar energy that, if exploited, could power just about any civilization we wish to maintain. There is no technical limitation to providing continuous, carbon-free power from space solar power satellites beaming power back to the surface of the Earth anywhere it might be needed. The main opposition to this idea derives from an unwillingness to consider centralized power systems on ideological grounds, combined with the unexpected reality of very cheap natural gas today. Even the most conservative consideration of near-Earth asteroid resources suggests that there is no reason to view the Earth as a closed system to which nothing can be added. The time for the settlement of Mars will come, but first we need to build on our success in developing the resources of Earth orbit, in the form of navigation, Earth observation, communication, and weather satellites, by fully developing the economic potential of the Earth-Moon system. Space settlements must flow out of the development of the economic resources of space if they are to be sustainable in the long term. The NSS has developed a complete description of milestones toward the development of space settlements. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. But wait—Google is doing exactly that. A key first step toward space settlement is ensuring a gapless transition from the existing International Space Station to commercially owned and operated LEO space stations as described in the NSS position paper “Next Generation Space Stations.” Next will come the development of the resources of the Moon and neaby asteroids leading to the creation of a self-sustaining Earth-Moon economy. Once we have established an asteroid-Earth-Moon economy that makes the resources found in this region fully available for projects ranging from the construction of solar power satellites to fueling future Mars missions, trips to Mars will be far less of a reach than they are today. In view of the above, Astro Teller was probably right to turn down the “space cadet” who wanted Google X to spend money on Mars settlement. Currently Google’s money would be better spent in low Earth orbit, among the asteroids, and on the Moon, joining forces with the growing number of entrepreneurs seeking their fortunes in space. But wait—Google is doing exactly that by sponsoring the Google Lunar X PRIZE to encourage private groups to send landers to the Moon, and investing $900 million in Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Given that corporate Google (now Alphabet) has just made a massive investment in a company founded to settle Mars, the Tellers’ essay sounds a bit like sour grapes. In any case, the Tellers are completely wrong in their disregard of the potential economic benefits of space development and the underlying motivation for space settlement.

#### Cap net reduces war

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist

assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin's Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states' alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states' interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states' behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other's regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### Growth key to transhumanism

**Bostrom**, Swedish philosopher at St. Cross College, University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk and the anthropic principle, Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, **2005**(Nick, “Transhumanist Values,” June 23,<http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/more/transhumanist-values/>)

If this is the grand vision, what are the more particular objectives that it translates into when considered as a guide to policy?¶ What is needed for the realization of the transhumanist dream is that technological means necessary for venturing into the posthuman space are made available to those who wish to use them, and that society be organized in such a manner that such explorations can be undertaken without causing unacceptable damage to the social fabric and without imposing unacceptable existential risks.¶ Global security. While disasters and setbacks are inevitable in the implementation of the transhumanist project (just as they are if the transhumanist project is not pursued), **there is one kind of catastrophe that must be avoided at any cost**:¶ **Existential risk** – one where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.[6]¶ Several recent discussions have argued that the combined probability of the existential risks is very substantial.[7] The relevance of the condition of existential safety to the transhumanist vision is obvious: **if we go extinct** or permanently destroy our potential to develop further, **then the transhumanist core value will not be realized. Global security is** the most **fundamental and nonnegotiable** requirement of the transhumanist project.¶ Technological progress. That **technological progress is** generally **desirable** from a transhumanist point of view is also self-evident. Many of our biological shortcomings (aging, disease, feeble memories and intellects, a limited emotional repertoire and inadequate capacity for sustained well-being) are difficult to overcome, **and** to do so will require advanced tools. Developing these tools is a gargantuan challenge for the collective problem-solving capacities of our species. Since technological progress is **closely linked to** economic development, **economic growth** – or more precisely, productivity growth – can in some cases serve as a proxy for technological progress. (Productivity growth is, of course, only an imperfect measure of the relevant form of technological progress, which, in turn, is an imperfect measure of overall improvement, since it omits such factors as equity of distribution, ecological diversity, and quality of human relationships.)

#### It solves every impact – leads to immortality, infinite value to life, and permanent happiness

**Bostrom**, Swedish philosopher at St. Cross College, University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk and the anthropic principle, Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, **2005**(Nick, “Transhumanist Values,” June 23,<http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/more/transhumanist-values/>)

The range of thoughts, feelings, experiences, and activities accessible to human organisms presumably constitute only a tiny part of what is possible. There is no reason to think that the human mode of being is any more free of limitations imposed by our biological nature than are those of other animals. In much the same way as Chimpanzees lack the cognitive wherewithal to understand what it is like to be human – the ambitions we humans have, our philosophies, the complexities of human society, or the subtleties of our relationships with one another, so we humans may lack the capacity to form a realistic intuitive understanding of what it would be like to be a radically enhanced human (a “posthuman”) and of the thoughts, concerns, aspirations, and social relations that such humans may have.¶ **Our** own **current mode of being**, therefore, **spans** but **a minute subspace of what is possible** or permitted by the physical constraints of the universe (see Figure 1). It is not farfetched to suppose that there are parts of this larger space that represent extremely valuable ways of living, relating, feeling, and thinking.¶ The limitations of the human mode of being are so pervasive and familiar that we often fail to notice them, and to question them requires manifesting an almost childlike naivete’. Let consider some of the more basic ones.¶ Lifespan. Because of the precarious conditions in which our Pleistocene ancestors lived, the human lifespan has evolved to be a paltry seven or **eight decades**. This **is**, from many perspectives, **a** rather **short period of time**. Even tortoises do better than that.¶ We don’t have to use geological or cosmological comparisons to highlight the meagerness of our allotted time budgets. To get a sense that we might be missing out on something important by our tendency to die early, we only have to bring to mind some of the worthwhile things that we could have done or attempted to do if we had had more time. For gardeners, educators, scholars, artists, city planners, and those who simply relish observing and participating in the cultural or political variety shows of life, three scores and ten is often insufficient for seeing even one major project through to completion, let alone for undertaking many such projects in sequence.¶ Human **character development is** also **cut short by** aging and **death**. Imagine what might have become of a Beethoven or a Goethe if they had still been with us today. Maybe they would have developed into rigid old grumps interested exclusively in conversing about the achievements of their youth. But maybe, if they had continued to enjoy health and youthful vitality, they would have continued to grow as men and **artists**, to **reach levels of maturity that we can barely imagine**. We certainly cannot rule that out based on what we know today. Therefore, **there is** at least **a serious possibility of there being something very precious outside the human sphere**. This constitutes a reason to pursue the means that will let us go there and find out.¶ Intellectual capacity. We have all had moments when we wished we were a little smarter. The three-pound, cheese-like thinking machine that we lug around in our skulls can do some neat tricks, but it also has significant shortcomings. Some of these – such as forgetting to buy milk or failing to attain native fluency in languages you learn as an adult – are obvious and require no elaboration. These shortcomings are inconveniences but hardly fundamental barriers to human development.¶ Yet there is a more profound sense in the constraints of our intellectual apparatus limit our modes of our mentation. I mentioned the Chimpanzee analogy earlier: just as is the case for the great apes, **our** own **cognitive makeup may foreclose whole strata of understanding and mental activity**. The point here is not about any logical or metaphysical impossibility: we need not suppose that posthumans would not be Turing computable or that they would have concepts that could not be expressed by any finite sentences in our language, or anything of that sort. The impossibility that I am referring to is more like the impossibility for us current humans to visualize an 200-dimensional hypersphere or to read, with perfect recollection and understanding, every book in the Library of Congress. These things are impossible for us because, simply put, we lack the brainpower. In the same way, may lack the ability to intuitively understand what being a posthuman would be like or to grok the playing field of posthuman concerns.¶ Further, **our** human **brains may cap our ability to discover philosophical and scientific truths**. It is possible that failure of philosophical research to arrive at solid, generally accepted answers to many of the traditional big philosophical questions could be due to the fact that we are not smart enough to be successful in this kind of enquiry. Our cognitive limitations may be **confining us in a Platonic cave**, where the best we can do is theorize about “shadows”, that is, representations that are sufficiently oversimplified and dumbed-down to fit inside a human brain.¶ Bodily functionality. We enhance our natural immune systems by getting vaccinations, and we can imagine further enhancements to our bodies that would protect us from disease or help us shape our bodies according to our desires (e.g. by letting us control our bodies’ metabolic rate). Such enhancements could improve the quality of our lives.¶ A more radical kind of upgrade might be possible if we suppose a computational view of the mind. **It may** then **be possible to upload a human mind to a computer**, by replicating in silico the detailed computational processes that would normally take place in a particular human brain.[4] Being an upload would have many potential advantages, such as the ability **to make back-up copies of oneself**

(favorably impacting on one’s life-expectancy) **and** the ability to **transmit oneself as information at the speed of light**. Uploads might live either in virtual reality or directly in physical reality by controlling a robot proxy.¶ Sensory modalities, special faculties and sensibilities. The current human sensory modalities are not the only possible ones, and they are certainly not as highly developed as they could be. Some animals have sonar, magnetic orientation, or sensors for electricity and vibration; many have a much keener sense of smell, sharper eyesight, etc. The range of possible sensory modalities is not limited to those we find in the animal kingdom. There is no fundamental block to adding say a capacity to see infrared radiation or to perceive radio signals and perhaps to add some kind of telepathic sense by augmenting our brains with suitably interfaced radio transmitters.¶ Humans also enjoy a variety of special faculties, such as appreciation of music and a sense of humor, and sensibilities such as the capacity for sexual arousal in response to erotic stimuli. Again, there is no reason to think that what we have exhausts the range of the possible, and **we can** certainly **imagine higher levels of sensitivity and responsiveness**.¶ Mood, energy, and self-control. Despite our best efforts, **we** often **fail to feel** as **happy** as we would like. Our chronic levels of subjective well-being seem to be largely genetically determined. **Life-events have little long-term impact**; the crests and troughs of fortune push us up and bring us down, but there is little long-term effect on self-reported well-being. **Lasting joy remains elusive** except for those of us who are lucky enough to have been born with a temperament that plays in a major key.¶ In addition to being at the mercy of a genetically determined setpoint for our levels of well-being, we are limited in regard to energy, will-power, and ability to shape our own character in accordance with our ideals. Even such “simple” goals as losing weight or quitting smoking prove unattainable to many.¶ Some subset of **these** kinds of **problems might be necessary rather than contingent upon our current nature**. For example, we cannot both have the ability easily to break any habit and the ability to form stable, hard-to-break habits. (In this regard, the best one can hope for may be the ability to easily get rid of habits we didn’t deliberately choose for ourselves in the first place, and perhaps a more versatile habit-formation system that would let us choose with more precision when to acquire a habit and how much effort it should cost to break it.)

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus, an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts. [Ignore the Fake Climate Debate, 1-23-2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816]//BPS

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.

#### Capitalism turns structural violence --- maintaining growth minimizes the chances of violent impacts happening to the impoverished and marginalized

Pinker 18 (Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM) \*\*Modified for gendered language

In the stacked layer graph in figure 8-5, the thickness of the bottom slab represents the number of people living in extreme poverty, the thickness of the top slab represents the number not living in poverty, and the height of the stack represents the population of the world. It shows that the number of poor people declined just as the number of all people exploded, from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.3 billion in 2015. (Max Roser points out that if news outlets truly reported the changing state of the world, they could have run the headline NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EXTREME POVERTY FELL BY 137,000 SINCE YESTERDAY every day for the last twenty-five years.) We live in a world not just with a smaller proportion of extremely poor people but with a smaller number of them, and with 6.6 billion people who are not extremely poor. Figure 8-5: Extreme poverty (number), 1820–2015 Sources: Our World in Data, Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2017, based on data from Bourguignon & Morrison 2002 (1820–1992) and the World Bank 2016g (1981–2015). Most surprises in history are unpleasant surprises, but this news came as a pleasant shock even to the optimists. In 2000 the United Nations laid out eight Millennium Development Goals, their starting lines backdated to 1990.25 At the time, cynical observers of that underperforming organization dismissed the targets as aspirational boilerplate. Cut the global poverty rate in half, lifting a billion people out of poverty, in twenty-five years? Yeah, yeah. But the world reached the goal five years ahead of schedule. Development experts are still rubbing their eyes. Deaton writes, “This is perhaps the most important fact about wellbeing in the world since World War II.”26 The economist Robert Lucas (like Deaton, a Nobel laureate) said, “The consequences for human welfare involved [in understanding rapid economic development] are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”27 Let’s not stop thinking about tomorrow. Though it’s always dangerous to extrapolate a historical curve, what happens when we try? If we align a ruler with the World Bank data in figure 8-4, we find that it crosses the x-axis (indicating a poverty rate of 0) in 2026. The UN gave itself a cushion in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the successor to its Millennium Development Goals) and set a target of “ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030.28 Ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere! May I live to see the day. (Not even Jesus was that optimistic: he told a supplicant, “The poor you will always have with you.”) Of course that day is a ways off. Hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and getting to zero will require a greater effort than just extrapolating along a ruler. Though the numbers are dwindling in countries like India and Indonesia, they are increasing in the poorest of the poor countries, like Congo, Haiti, and Sudan, and the last pockets of poverty will be the hardest to eliminate.29 Also, as we approach the goal we should move the goalposts, since not-so-extreme poverty is still poverty. In introducing the concept of progress I warned against confusing hard-won headway with a process that magically takes place by itself. The point of calling attention to progress is not self-congratulation but identifying the causes so we can do more of what works. And since we know that something has worked, it’s unnecessary to keep depicting the developing world as a basket case to shake people out of their apathy—with the danger that they will think that additional support would just be throwing money down a rat hole.30 So what is the world doing right? As with most forms of progress, a lot of good things happen at once and reinforce one another, so it’s hard to identify a first domino. Cynical explanations, such as that the enrichment is a one-time dividend of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities, or that the statistics are inflated by the rise of populous China, have been examined and dismissed. Radelet and other development experts point to five causes.31 “In 1976,” Radelet writes, “Mao single-handedly and dramatically changed the direction of global poverty with one simple act: he died.”32 Though China’s rise is not exclusively responsible for the Great Convergence, the country’s sheer bulk is bound to move the totals around, and the explanations for its progress apply elsewhere. The death of Mao Zedong is emblematic of three of the major causes of the Great Convergence. The first is the decline of communism (together with intrusive socialism). For reasons we have seen, market economies can generate wealth prodigiously while totalitarian planned economies impose scarcity, stagnation, and often famine. Market economies, in addition to reaping the benefits of specialization and providing incentives for people to produce things that other people want, solve the problem of coordinating the efforts of hundreds of millions of people by using prices to propagate information about need and availability far and wide, a computational problem that no planner is brilliant enough to solve from a central bureau.33 A shift from collectivization, centralized control, government monopolies, and suffocating permit bureaucracies (what in India was called “the license raj”) to open economies took place on a number of fronts beginning in the 1980s. They included Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of capitalism in China, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the economies of India, Brazil, Vietnam, and other countries. Though intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defense of capitalism, its economic benefits are so obvious that they don’t need to be shown with numbers. They can literally be seen from space. A satellite photograph of Korea showing the capitalist South aglow in light and the Communist North a pit of darkness vividly illustrates the contrast in the wealth-generating capability between the two economic systems, holding geography, history, and culture constant. Other matched pairs with an experimental group and a control group lead to the same conclusion: West and East Germany when they were divided by the Iron Curtain; Botswana versus Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe; Chile versus Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—the latter a once-wealthy, oil-rich country now suffering from widespread hunger and a critical shortage of medical care.34 It’s important to add that the market economies which blossomed in the more fortunate parts of the developing world were not the laissez-faire anarchies of right-wing fantasies and left-wing nightmares. To varying degrees, their governments invested in education, public health, infrastructure, and agricultural and job training, together with social insurance and poverty-reduction programs.35 Radelet’s second explanation of the Great Convergence is leadership. Mao imposed more than communism on China. He was a mercurial megalomaniac who foisted crackbrained schemes on the country, such as the Great Leap Forward (with its gargantuan communes, useless backyard smelters, and screwball agronomic practices) and the Cultural Revolution (which turned the younger generation into gangs of thugs who terrorized teachers, managers, and descendants of “rich peasants”).36 During the decades of stagnation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, many other developing countries were commandeered by psychopathic strongmen with ideological, religious, tribal, paranoid, or self-aggrandizing agendas rather than a mandate to enhance the well-being of their citizens. Depending on their sympathy or antipathy for communism, they were propped up by the Soviet Union or the United States under the principle “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”37 The 1990s and 2000s saw a spread of democracy (chapter 14) and the rise of levelheaded, humanistic leaders—not just national statesmen like Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf but local religious and civil-society leaders acting to improve the lives of their compatriots.38 A third cause was the end of the Cold War. It not only pulled the rug out from under a number of tinpot dictators but snuffed out many of the civil wars that had racked developing countries since they attained independence in the 1960s. Civil war is both a humanitarian disaster and an economic one, as facilities are destroyed, resources are diverted, children are kept out of school, and managers and workers are pulled away from work or killed. The economist Paul Collier, who calls war “development in reverse,” has estimated that a typical civil war costs a country $50 billion.39 A fourth cause is globalization, in particular the explosion in trade made possible by container ships and jet airplanes and by the liberalization of tariffs and other barriers to investment and trade. Classical economics and common sense agree that a larger trading network should make everyone, on average, better off. As countries specialize in different goods and services, they can produce them more efficiently, and it doesn’t cost them much more to offer their wares to billions of people than to thousands. At the same time buyers, shopping for the best price in a global bazaar, can get more of what they want. (Common sense is less likely to appreciate a corollary called comparative advantage, which predicts that, on average, everyone is better off when each country sells the goods and services that it can produce most efficiently even if the buyers could produce them still more efficiently themselves.) Notwithstanding the horror that the word elicits in many parts of the political spectrum, globalization, development analysts agree, has been a bonanza for the poor. Deaton notes, “Some argue that globalization is a neoliberal conspiracy designed to enrich a very few at the expense of many. If so, that conspiracy was a disastrous failure—or at least, it helped more than a billion people as an unintended consequence. If only unintended consequences always worked so favorably.”40 To be sure, the industrialization of the developing world, like the Industrial Revolution two centuries before it, has produced working conditions that are harsh by the standards of modern rich countries and have elicited bitter condemnation. The Romantic movement in the 19th century was partly a reaction to the “dark satanic mills” (as William Blake called them), and since that time a loathing of industry has been a sacred value of C. P. Snow’s Second Culture of literary intellectuals.41 Nothing in Snow’s essay enraged his assailant F. R. Leavis as much as this passage: It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think that material standards of living don’t matter all that much. It is all very well for one, as a personal choice, to reject industrialization—do a modern Walden if you like, and if you go without much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept twenty years off your own life, then I respect you for the strength of your aesthetic revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the same choice on others who are not free to choose. In fact, we know what their choice would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into the factories as fast as the factories could take them.42 As we have seen, Snow was accurate in his claims about advances in life and health, and he was also right that the appropriate standard in considering the plight of the poor in industrializing countries is the set of alternatives available to them where and when they live. Snow’s argument is being echoed fifty years later by development experts such as Radelet, who observes that “while working on the factory floor is often referred to as sweatshop labor, it is often better than the grand[parent] of all sweatshops: working in the fields as an agricultural day laborer.” When I lived in Indonesia in the early 1990s, I arrived with a somewhat romanticized view of the beauty of people working in rice paddies, together with reservations about the rapidly growing factory jobs. The longer I was there, the more I recognized how incredibly difficult it is to work in the rice fields. It’s a backbreaking grind, with people eking out the barest of livings by bending over for hours in the hot sun to terrace the fields, plant the seeds, pull the weeds, transplant the seedlings, chase the pests, and harvest the grain. Standing in the pools of water brings leeches and the constant risk of malaria, encephalitis, and other diseases. And, of course, it is hot, all the time. So, it was not too much of a surprise that when factory jobs opened offering wages of $2 a day, hundreds of people lined up just to get a shot at applying.43 The benefits of industrial employment can go beyond material living standards. For the women who get these jobs, it can be a liberation. In her article “The Feminist Side of Sweatshops,” Chelsea Follett (the managing editor of HumanProgress) recounts that factory work in the 19th century offered women an escape from the traditional gender roles of farm and village life, and so was held by some men at the time “sufficient to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl.” The girls themselves did not always see it that way. A textile mill worker in Lowell, Massachusetts, wrote in 1840: We are collected . . . to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can. . . . Strange would it be, if in money-loving New England, one of the most lucrative female employments should be rejected because it is toilsome, or because some people are prejudiced against it. Yankee girls have too much independence for that.44 Here again, experiences during the Industrial Revolution prefigure those in the developing world today. Kavita Ramdas, the head of the Global Fund for Women, said in 2001 that in an Indian village “all there is for a woman is to obey her husband and relatives, pound millet, and sing. If she moves to town, she can get a job, start a business, and get education for her children.”45 An analysis in Bangladesh confirmed that the women who worked in the garment industry (as my grandparents did in 1930s Canada) enjoyed rising wages, later marriage, and fewer and better-educated children.46 Over the course of a generation, slums, barrios, and favelas can morph into suburbs, and the working class can become middle class.47 To appreciate the long-term benefits of industrialization one does not have to accept its cruelties. One can imagine an alternative history of the Industrial Revolution in which modern sensibilities applied earlier and the factories operated without children and with better working conditions for the adults. Today there are doubtless factories in the developing world that could offer as many jobs and still turn a profit while treating their workers more humanely. Pressure from trade negotiators and consumer protests has measurably improved working conditions in many places, and it is a natural progression as countries get richer and more integrated into the global community (as we will see in chapters 12 and 17 when we look at the history of working conditions in our own society).48 Progress consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package—as if we had to make a yes-or-no decision on whether the Industrial Revolution, or globalization, is a good thing or bad thing, exactly as each has unfolded in every detail. Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms. The last, and in many analyses the most important, contributor to the Great Convergence is science and technology.49 Life is getting cheaper, in a good way. Thanks to advances in know-how, an hour of labor can buy more food, health, education, clothing, building materials, and small necessities and luxuries than it used to. Not only can people eat cheaper food and take cheaper medicines, but children can wear cheap plastic sandals instead of going barefoot, and adults can hang out together getting their hair done or watching a soccer game using cheap solar panels and appliances. As for good advice on health, farming, and business: it’s better than cheap; it’s free. Today about half the adults in the world own a smartphone, and there are as many subscriptions as people. In parts of the world without roads, landlines, postal service, newspapers, or banks, mobile phones are more than a way to share gossip and cat photos; they are a major generator of wealth. They allow people to transfer money, order supplies, track the weather and markets, find day labor, get advice on health and farming practices, even obtain a primary education.50 An analysis by the economist Robert Jensen subtitled “The Micro and Mackerel Economics of Information” showed how South Indian small fishermen increased their income and lowered the local price of fish by using their mobile phones at sea to find the market which offered the best price that day, sparing them from having to unload their perishable catch on fish-glutted towns while other towns went fishless.51 In this way mobile phones are allowing hundreds of millions of small farmers and fishers to become the omniscient rational actors in the ideal frictionless markets of economics textbooks. According to one estimate, every cell phone adds $3,000 to the annual GDP of a developing country.52 The beneficent power of knowledge has rewritten the rules of global development. Development experts differ on the wisdom of foreign aid. Some argue that it does more harm than good by enriching corrupt governments and competing with local commerce.53 Others cite recent numbers which suggest that intelligently allocated aid has in fact done tremendous good.54 But while they disagree on the effects of donated food and dollars, all agree that donated technology—medicines, electronics, crop varieties, and best practices in agriculture, business, and public health—has been an unalloyed boon. (As Jefferson noted, he who receives an idea from me receives instruction without lessening mine.) And for all the emphasis I’ve placed on GDP per capita, the value of knowledge has made that measure less relevant to what we really care about, quality of life. If I had squeezed a line for Africa into the lower right corner of figure 8-3, it would look unimpressive: the line would curve upward, to be sure, but without the exponential blastoff of the lines for Europe and Asia. Charles Kenny emphasizes that the actual progress of Africa belies the shallow slope, because health, longevity, and education are so much more affordable than they used to be. Though in general people in richer countries live longer (a relationship called the Preston curve, after the economist who discovered it), the whole curve is being pushed upward, as everyone is living longer regardless of income.55 In the richest country two centuries ago (the Netherlands), life expectancy was just forty, and in no country was it above forty-five. Today, life expectancy in the poorest country in the world (the Central African Republic) is fifty-four, and in no country is it below forty-five.56 Though it’s easy to sneer at national income as a shallow and materialistic measure, it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing, as we will repeatedly see in the chapters to come. Most obviously, GDP per capita correlates with longevity, health, and nutrition.57 Less obviously, it correlates with higher ethical values like peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance.58 Richer countries, on average, fight fewer wars with each other (chapter 11), are less likely to be riven by civil wars (chapter 11), are more likely to become and stay democratic (chapter 14), and have greater respect for human rights (chapter 14—on average, that is; Arab oil states are rich but repressive). The citizens of richer countries have greater respect for “emancipative” or liberal values such as women’s equality, free speech, gay rights, participatory democracy, and protection of the environment (chapters 10 and 15). Not surprisingly, as countries get richer they get happier (chapter 18); more surprisingly, as countries get richer they get smarter (chapter 16).59 In explaining this Somalia-to-Sweden continuum, with poor violent repressive unhappy countries at one end and rich peaceful liberal happy ones at the other, correlation is not causation, and other factors like education, geography, history, and culture may play roles.60 But when the quants try to tease them apart, they find that economic development does seem to be a major mover of human welfare.61 In an old academic joke, a dean is presiding over a faculty meeting when a genie appears and offers him one of three wishes—money, fame, or wisdom. The dean replies, “That’s easy. I’m a scholar. I’ve devoted my life to understanding. Of course I’ll take wisdom.” The genie waves his hand and vanishes in a puff of smoke. The smoke clears to reveal the dean with his head in his hands, lost in thought. A minute elapses. Ten minutes. Fifteen. Finally a professor calls out, “Well? Well?” The dean mutters, “I should have taken the money.”

#### No one gets on board for a mindset shift

**Buch-Hansen, 18**—Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School (Hubert, “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy,” Ecological Economics Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 157-163, dml)

Political projects do not become hegemonic **just because they embody good ideas**. For a project to become hegemonic, (organic) intellectuals **first** need to develop the project and a **constellation of social forces** with **sufficient power** and **resources** to implement it then needs to **find it appealing** and **struggle for it**. In this context, it is worth noting that degrowth, as a social movement, has been gaining momentum for some time, not least in Southern Europe. Countless grassroots' initiatives (e.g., D'Alisa et al., 2013) are the most visible manifestations that degrowth is on the rise. Intellectuals – including founders of ecological economics such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly, and more recently degrowth scholars such as Serge Latouche and Giorgos Kallis – have played a major role in developing and disseminating the ideas underpinning the project. A growing interest in degrowth in academia, as well as well-attended biennial international degrowth conferences, also indicate that an increasing number of people embrace such ideas.

Still, the degrowth project is **nowhere near enjoying the degree** and **type of support it needs** if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political **parties**, labour **unions**, **business associations** and **international organisations** that have so far embraced degrowth is **modest to say the least**. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are **united in the belief** that economic growth is **necessary** and **desirable**. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. **In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis**, a **pro-growth discourse** in other words **continues to be hegemonic**: it is **widely considered a matter of common sense** that continued economic growth is **required**.

It is also noteworthy that **economic** and **political elites**, to a **large extent**, **continue to support** the neoliberal project, **even in the face of its evident shortcomings**. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis **did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital** that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a **more authoritarian phase** (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a **foregone conclusion** that this fraction and the **wider coalition** behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm **unattractive** and that such social forces will **vehemently oppose** the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power.

Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23).

In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the **political ability to mobilize majorities** in parliamentary democracies, and a **sufficient measure** of **at least passive consent**’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth **enjoys little support** in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is **hegemonic among parties** in government.5 With capital accumulation being the **most important driving force** in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are **generally eager** to create conditions **conducive to production** and the **accumulation of capital** (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “**programmed**” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a **strategically selective terrain** that **works to the disadvantage** of the degrowth project.

The main advocates of the degrowth project are **grassroots**, **small fractions** of **left-wing parties** and **labour unions** as well as **academics** and **other citizens** who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has **only modest resources compared to other political projects**. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth **do not possess instruments** that enable them to **force political decision-makers** to **listen to** – let alone **comply with** – their views. As such, they are in a **weaker position than the labour union movement** was in its heyday, and they are in a **far weaker position than the owners** and **managers of large corporations** are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent

It is also safe to say that degrowth **enjoys no “passive consent”** from the **majority of the population**. For the time being, degrowth **remains unknown to most people**. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people **would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing**. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project.

Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will **inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow**. Today, the vast majority of people **find it almost impossible** to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘**widespread sense** that not only is capitalism the **only viable**

**political** and **economic system**, but also that it is now impossible to **even imagine a coherent alternative to it**’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the **only system that can function**; it is also up against the additional challenge that it **speaks against economic growth** in a world where the desirability of growth is **considered common sense**.

Second, degrowth is **incompatible with the lifestyles** to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it **difficult to completely escape**. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is **widely considered a natural right** to lead an **environmentally unsustainable lifestyle** – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has **increasingly been exported to other parts of the world**, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a **violent encroachment on their personal freedom**. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, **fewer are prepared** to **actually change their own lifestyles** to reverse/address this.

At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is **conceivable** that **at some point**, **enough people** will become **sufficiently discontent** with the existing economic system and **push for something radically different**. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, **various material** and **ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development**, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. **Even if it were to happen** that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is **far from given** that a system based on the ideas of **degrowth is what they would demand**.

## 1ar

### k

#### Financialization is empirically denied

Kaplan 17 [Steven N., Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, “Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts,” May 2017, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972117>]

U.S. companies are frequently criticized for focusing too much on the short run and not enough on the long run. For example, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, one of the largest money managers, wrote that “the effects of the short-termist phenomenon are troubling . . . more and more corporate leaders have responded with actions that can deliver immediate returns to shareholders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, while underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth.”1 The Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity (co-chaired by Larry Summers) similarly weighed in, “An additional reason for the absence of inclusive prosperity is the changing nature of corporate behavior. Business leaders, government officials and academics have pointed out that corporations have shifted their traditional focus on long-term profit maximization to maximizing short-term stock-market valuations. One reason that economists have advanced for this transition to corporate short- termism is the overwhelming shift to stock-market-based compensation for CEOs and other highly compensated executives at publicly traded corporations.”2 In other words, these critics argue that US companies as a group destroy value by not investing for the long run. More formally, the short-term argument can be summarized as follows. U.S companies as a group underinvest in capital expenditures as well as research and development. According to the argument, this benefits the companies in the short- term, but harms the companies in the long run where the short-term is usually defined as the current quarter or, perhaps, current year or two, while the long-term would be more than five years out. Poor corporate governance and overly generous pay plans for CEOs that reward short-term behavior are often cited as accomplices to short-termism.3 The critics also point to empirical evidence to support their positions. For example, Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 financial executives and find that 78 percent would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings. Others point to corporate dividends and buybacks. Lazonick (2014) shows that S&P 500 companies paid out over 90% of their net income in dividends and share repurchases, leaving little available for investment in the long-term. Lazonick and others contend that companies buy back their own stock to boost their share prices in the short run, regardless of the long-term impact. These criticisms, however, are not new. They have been raised, prominently, in some form or another since the late 1970s. In this paper, I present those historical criticisms. I then consider the implications of sustained short-termism for corporate profits, venture capital investment and returns, private equity investment and returns, and corporate valuations. In fact, there is very little long-term evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the short-term critics.4 1. Some Short-termist History The criticism that US companies are plagued by short-termism and poor governance has a long history. In 1980, Harvard Business School’s Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy wrote an influential article criticizing American companies for being too short-term oriented: “By their preference for servicing existing markets rather than creating new ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and management by the numbers, many of them have effectively forsworn long-term technological superiority as a competitive weapon. In consequence, they have abdicated their strategic responsibilities.” Similarly, Marty Lipton wrote in 1979: “It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the long-term interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested . . . only in a quick profit . . . ?” In 1992, Harvard’s Michael E. Porter repeated the argument: “The U.S. system of allocating investment capital is failing, putting American companies at a serious disadvantage and threatening the long-term growth of the nation's economy… Many American companies invest too little, particularly in those intangible assets and capabilities required for competitiveness – R&D, employee training and skills development … The U.S. system, first and foremost advances the goals of shareholders at the expense of the long-term performance of American companies. In global competition, where investment increasingly determines a company's capacity to upgrade and innovate, the U.S. system does not measure up.” And the short-term argument is being repeated today by the likes of Laurence Fink and Larry Summers. While some, like Fink, focus on public companies, the arguments of Abernathy and Hayes, Porter, Summers refer to the overall U.S. economy. 2. U.S. Corporate Profits It is clear from the previous section that critiques of U.S. businesses as overly short-term oriented have been with us for at least 35 years. And the criticisms have not changed much, if at all, in their basic tenor. But, this has very strong implications for the short-term argument. It’s been more than 35 years since the publication of the Hayes and Abernathy article, and 25 years since the appearance of Porter’s. By any measure, today is the long-term that U.S. companies supposedly have underinvested in since the 1980s. Accordingly, the short-term logic implies that U.S. business should be performing poorly today. But that is unequivocally not the case. Figure 1 reports U.S. corporate profits before tax as a fraction of GDP since 1951. Today, corporate profits are near all-time highs (over that post-war period). The uptrend began just around the time of the Hayes and Abernathy article, and has continued since. The early 1980s is precisely the time that many observers believe finance and the goal of shareholder value maximization became ascendant. It is also the time that Wall Street and the financial sector began to grow substantially—both in the US and internationally. The early 1980s also coincided with the rise of management consultants who spread techniques across US firms and across the world.5 In 1980, consulting firms were relatively new and relatively small. Today, McKinsey & Company has offices in more than 60 countries; the Boston Consulting Group has offices in more than 40. And the early 1980s also coincided with an explosion in information technology and globalization. Consistent with the increase in corporate profits, both Autor et al. (2017) and Burkai (2016) explore explanations for the strong corporate profitability and, concomitant, weak labor share of GDP. Whatever its source, the strong profitability of U.S. corporations is difficult for the short-termists to explain. It is obviously not consistent with poor corporate performance over the long-term. Nevertheless, short-termists continue to repeat the criticisms of the 1980s and 1990s. It is worth adding that the strong corporate performance also is inconsistent with poor corporate governance overall, suggesting that criticisms of U.S. corporate governance also are overstated. This is arguably the type of example that the quote by John Stuart Mill that begins this paper had in mind.

#### Fourth wave of science solves

**Kaku 18** [Michio, an American theoretical physicist, futurist, and popularizer of science. He is a professor of theoretical physics in the City College of New York and CUNY Graduate Center. “There's Only One Way For Humanity to Survive. Go To Mars.,” <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/02/there-s-only-one-way-for-humanity-to-survive--go-to-mars-/>]

You use the phrase “the fourth wave of science.” Explain what this means and how it could one day make it possible to terraform Mars. We’ve had three waves of scientific innovation. The first wave, the Industrial Revolution, gave us the steam engine, the locomotive, and factories. The second wave was electricity and magnetism, whereby we had TV, internal combustion cars, a beginning of the space program. The third revolution is high tech: computers, lasers, the Internet. Now we have the fourth wave of innovation: artificial intelligence, biotech, and nanotech. That’s going to change the way we view Mars. Many people say Mars is cold and desolate, and there’s nothing to grow there. We can genetically modify plants and algae to thrive in the Martian atmosphere. But who’s going to do the heavy lifting? We all would like to see futuristic cities on Mars, but robots are going to become much more adapted to working in these harsh environments by the end of this century, so we expect to see robotic construction workers building the fantastic domed cities you see in science fiction novels.